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I. INTRODUCTION
It is...essential to increase understanding of the profound
sense of deprivation experienced by indigenous populations
when the land to which they, as peoples, have been bound for
thousands of years is taken away from them. No one should
be permitted to destroy that bond. Systematic violations of
the rights of indigenous peoples to land and its resources
should cease.,
The indigenous peoples of the Bolivian Amazon Basin would
find many of their fears and aspirations reflected in the words of
U.N. Special Rapporteur Cobo. Their struggle to defend their
ancestral lands has become increasingly acute in response to the
growing number and variety of parties who continue to encroach
upon their lands.
These parties include several multinational oil companies,
who were recently granted exploration rights in lands which the
Bolivian government had previously designated "indigenous
territories." Although the government has recently taken steps
to consolidate and define the nature of indigenous peoples' rights
in these territories, it continues to place a high priority on
protecting third party interests to the detriment of indigenous
peoples.2
The arrival in 1995 of oil companies on indigenous territory
without any prior notice or consultation gave rise to great
concern among indigenous peoples and the non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) who support them. 3 It appeared that once
1. J. MARTiNEZ COBO, STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN:4/Sub. 2/1986/7/Add. 4 par. 510 (1986).
2. See generally 1997 1(1) Loma Santa I BOLETfN INTORMATIVO DEL CENTRO DE
PLANIFICACI6N TERRITORIAL INDIGENA DE CIDOB [hereinafter CPTI]. The election in
June 1997 of former dictator turned democrat, General Banzer, as President of Bolivia is
also expected to add to the uncertainty surrounding the question of indigenous land
claims. Telephone interview with Lic. Carlos Romero, Director, Centro de Estudios
Juridicos e Investigacion Social (CEJIS) June 1, 1997).
3. FabiAn Sandoval, Consults y Participaci6n de los Pueblos Indigenas y el Estado
en el Estado en Ia Gesti6n Ambiental de las Operaciones Petroliferas en Areas y
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again, they had been deprived of all control over entry by third
parties onto their traditional lands. Moreover, many were aware
of the devastating effects that oil operations have had on
indigenous peoples in the Ecuadorian Amazon, where over
twenty-five years of production led to major oil spills which
contaminated the soil and rivers and destroyed much of the fish
and wildlife on which the peoples depended. 4 Unregulated
construction of roads has led to uncontrolled "colonization" of
indigenous lands, the relocation of communities, a growing
dependency on low value transactions with oil workers and
therefore the loss of traditional, sustainable ways of life.5
Cancer, skin diseases and often fatal intestinal illness have
become increasingly common. This increase in disease is
generally attributed to the dumping of toxic and human waste in
unsealed, open pits. People have also suffered respiratory
ailments due to inhalation of dust particles covered with oil.6
Many studies have suggested that the consequences of oil
operations have been particularly severe for the fragile
ecosystems of the Amazon region.
7
The peoples of the Ecuadorian Amazon attempted to gain
redress against Texaco before the U.S. Federal Court, seeking
$1.5 billion U.S. in compensation for damages suffered. After
having been continually denied any redress for the injuries
described above in their own country, their claim was also
rejected in the United States8 Bolivia's indigenous peoples do
not wish to suffer the same fate. The Bolivian government has
Territorios Indigenas de Bolivia: Propuesta 1 (Trinidad: CEJIS, 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Inter-American Law Review).
4. United Nations, ESC, Commission on Human Rights, Discrimination against
indigenous peoples U.N. Doc.EICN.4/Sub.2/1991149 (1991) at 22; see also Suzana Sawyer,
Indigenous Initiatives and Petroleum Politics in the Ecuadorian Amazon, CULTURAL
SURVIVAL QUARTERLY 26 (Spring, 1996); CENTRO PARA DERECHOS ECONOMICOS Y
SOCIALES, VIOLACIONES DE DERECHOS EN LA AMAZONIA ECUATORIANA (1994).
5. Victoria C. Arthaud, Note Environmental Destruction in the Amazon, 7 GEO.
INT'LENVTL. L. REV. 195, 201, 214 (1994).
6. Id. at 212-13.
7. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE, OIL
EXPLORATION IN THE TROPICS: GUIDELINES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1991). The
IUCN has developed this set of guidelines designed specifically for tropical regions such
as the Amazon.
8. Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18364
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1994). The Court accepted Texaco's argument of forum non
conveniens, although the Court also reserved the right to review its decision if
negotiations between the parties remained fruitless. See generally, Arthaud, supra note
[Vol. 29:3
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recently taken some steps to ensure the protection of their rights
through constitutional and legislative reform.9 Indigenous
organizations have also been involved in negotiations regarding
the drafting of a specific regulation for oil operations in
indigenous territories.10 So far, however, there has been very
slow progress on this project.
Thus, Bolivia's indigenous peoples are searching for other
means of enforcing their rights and achieving preventive and
effective protection of their communities and their environment.
In many instances, they have looked to the International Labour
Organization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(ILO 169)11 as a basis for supporting their claims, given that in
1991 Bolivia ratified ILO 169 and adopted it into national law.12
Although it has been criticized by many indigenous
organizations, particularly those of northern countries such as
Canada,3 ILO 169 is generally viewed as an improvement over
its predecessor, ILO Convention 107 Concerning the Protection
and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries of 1957 (ILO 107).
14
Indigenous organizations from Central and South America have
pressed for ratification of ILO 169.15 The new Convention rejects
the integrationist and paternalistic approach taken by states in
the past, as reflected in ILO 107. According to the International
9. See infra Part I(B).
10. See infra Part I(C).
11. Adopted by the General Conference of the International Labour Organization,
Geneva, June 27, 1989; entered into force Sept. 5, 1991 [hereinafter ILO 169]. As of July
1995, Norway, Mexico, Colombia, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru, and Honduras had
ratified the Convention. In Fiji, Austria, and Argentina, there had been a decision by
Congress to ratify, but no instrument of ratification yet received by the ILO. To the
ILO's knowledge, the Convention was under consideration for ratification in Chile,
Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela, Denmark, Finland, and the Philippines. ILO, ILO GUIDE TO
CONVENTION 169 (1995) [hereinafter ILO GUIDE].
12. Bolivia ratified the Convention in July of 1991 with the deposit of its instrument
of ratification, Ley de la Republica No. 1257 del 11 de julio 1991 [hereinafter Ley 1257].
It is important to note that the ILO Constitutution proscribes reservations to its
conventions. CONST. OF THE ILO, art. 19, § 5(d) (1994).
13. See, e.g., Howard R. Berman, The International Labour Organization and
Indigenous Peoples: Revision of ILO Convention No. 107 at the 75th Session of the
International Labour Conference, 1988, 41 INT'L COMN. OF JURISTS REV. 48 (1988).
14. Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous
and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries of 1957. For
comments on ILO 107, see, e..g., U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP), 8th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN/Sub.2/1990/42 at 12.
15. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1996).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
Labour Office, ILO 169 encompasses two basic principles:
• respect for the cultures, ways of life and traditional
institutions of [indigenous and tribal] peoples; and
. effective involvement of these peoples in decisions that
affect them. 16
Essentially, these principles seek to address the racism,
marginalization and assimilationist policies that have
historically characterized State conduct toward indigenous
peoples and that were documented so completely by Special
Rapporteur Martinez Cobo in the 1980s. 17
ILO 169 is currently one of the only international
instruments in force-in the countries having ratified the
Convention-that deals explicitly with the rights of indigenous
peoples to natural resources pertaining to their lands. Thus, at
the moment, it provides one of the few positive law bases for
defending indigenous land and resource rights. For Bolivia's
indigenous peoples, in particular, it has been viewed as an
important legal tool. It is for this reason that this article will
focus on ILO 169 as a source of rights, obligations and potential
recourses available to Bolivia's indigenous peoples in the face of
the incursion of oil enterprises into their territories.
After providing an overview of the social and legal context in
which Bolivia's indigenous peoples currently live, this Comment
will analyze the obligations set out in ILO 169 relating to sub-
surface resources pertaining to indigenous lands. The Bolivian
government's recent conduct will be examined in light of these
obligations, in an attempt to determine whether the government
has failed to comply with the provisions of ILO 169.
This Comment then explores potential recourses available to
the indigenous peoples of the Bolivian Amazon Basin region
under national and international law. Finally, based on the
experience of Bolivia's indigenous peoples and the above
analysis, a critical assessment of ILO 169 will be made with a
view to offering some conclusions regarding certain weaknesses
of ILO 169 and its value as a strategic tool for use by indigenous
16. International Labour Organization (ILO) General Conference, 75th Sess.
Rep.VI(1): Partial Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 1957
(No. 107) 19 (1988) [hereinafter ILO Rep. VI(1)].
17. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 & Adds. 1-4 (1986).
456 [Vol. 29:3
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peoples in the defense of their rights and pursuit of self-
determination.
II. OIL AND THE PEOPLES OF THE BOLIVIAN AMAZON BASIN
REGION
In order to set the context for the legal analysis which
follows, a brief overview of the social, political and cultural
situation of the indigenous peoples of the Bolivian Amazon Basin
will be offered. The current state of oil operations in the region
will also be outlined.
A. The Indigenous Peoples of the Amazon Basin
Region
As in most countries-particularly those with borders
established by colonial powers-Bolivian society is highly diverse
and characterized by complex interactions between its various
peoples and social classes. The country is also one of the poorest
in South America, with low average life expectancies, high infant
and maternal mortality rates, serious problems of malnutrition,
a high illiteracy rate, and a hefty international public debt. 8
The country is about the size of the Canadian province of
Ontario, rich in natural resources, and has a population of about
eight million. Official statistics usually give the following rough
proportions for Bolivia's "ethnic composition": thirty percent
Quechua, twenty-five percent Aymara, twenty-fiver percent
Mestizo, ten percent European, two percent lowlands
Indigenous peoples and three percent other.19 In other words,
the majority of the population descends from peoples who were
present prior to the arrival of the Europeans.20
It is only the "original peoples" of the lowlands region,
however, who have tended to refer to themselves as "indigena,"
or indigenous. Other peoples tend to refer to themselves (or to
be referred to) as Quechua, Aymara or simply as "campesinos"
18. Centre for Intercultural Training, Canadian International Development Agency,
Bolivia-An Introduction 18-20 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
[hereinafter CIDA].
19. H. VAZQUEZ MACHICADO, ET AL., MANUAL DE HISTORIA DE BOLIVIA 616 (4th ed.,
1994).
20. CIDA, supra note 18.
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(roughly translated as peasants) if they still live outside of the
city. Thus, I will use the term "indigenous peoples" throughout
this paper to refer specifically to the peoples of the lowlands
region.
The country's population has historically been concentrated
in the high plains and valleys of the Andes. This concentration
was heightened after the arrival of the Spaniards, whose
principal goal was to exploit the wealth of gold and silver found
in the mountains. The focus of this paper, however, is on the
indigenous peoples of the Amazon Basin region in the
Northeastern part of Bolivia. In particular, we will be focusing
on the indigenous peoples living in the Beni and Pando
Departments and in the lowlands area of the Cochabamba
Department.1 The area represents about twenty percent of
Bolivia's territory, or roughly 220,000 square kilometres, an area
slightly smaller than Great Britain. However, the region's
population is only 330,000 or about five percent of the country's
total population. The people identifying themselves as
"indigenous" in the area only constitute about one fifth of the
region's population, and are estimated to be approximately
60,000 in number.22
Although their population is relatively small, there are
nearly thirty different ethnic groups living in this region,
including: the Araona, Baure, Cayubaba, Chimin, Ignaciano,
Itonama, Moset~n, Movima, Sirion6, Trinitario, Yuracar6 and
Yuqui.23 They have historically remained much more isolated
from contact with non-aboriginal peoples than the inhabitants of
the Andean regions. Archeological studies have suggested that
prior to the arrival of Spanish missionaries, there existed a
family-based network of communities and peoples engaged in
agriculture, fishing, hunting and some trade. The communities
were located primarily along the banks of the various tributaries
of the Amazon which flow through the region. Their hunting
grounds and areas from which they gathered other resources,
21. The Beni and Cochabamba Departments are in fact engaged in an acrimonious
dispute over certain portions of these lowlands. The dispute has implications for
indigenous peoples and their lands, but those issues exceed the scope of this paper.
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however, extended several kilometers away from the river
banks.24
Their culture and way of life was significantly affected by
the Jesuit missionaries who "reduced" these relatively spread
out communities to mission settlements prior to the eighteenth
century. Today, the peoples of the Oriente are predominantly
Catholic. However, their land remained relatively devoid of
other settlers and industrialists until the middle of this
century.25  Although there is now a significant urbanized
population, a large proportion of indigenous people continue to
live in small villages along the rivers and in relative isolation.
They depend on the resources provided by the surrounding
forests and rivers on lands they have traditionally occupied.
Native languages are still spoken in these communities.
This isolation sheltered these peoples in part from Bolivia's
turbulent political and social history.26 Over the past several
decades, however, the state has increasingly allowed and
promoted the exploitation of the area's rich natural resources-
in particular, its forests-and has encouraged settlement by
large-scale ranchers, among others.27 Population pressures in
the high plains region have led Quechua and Aymara farmers to
"colonize" the fertile lowlands. The area has also become known
as a haven for drug traffickers. Furthermore, the state and
other parties have begun to invest in the economic potential of
oil and natural gas resources which they believe exist in the
area, judging from the experience of other Amazon region
countries and according to scientific estimates.
28
24. See generally CIDDEBENI, Plan Preliminar de Manejo: Territorio Indigena
Parque Nacional Isiboro Sdcure (1994) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter
CIDDEBENI].
25. Id. at 10. This source notes, however, that the rubber boom of the late
nineteenth century did have some impact on the Beni peoples. Id.
26. Bolivia is famous in Latin America for having had 190 Presidents in its 171
years of Republican history.
27. See generally Jorge Vacaflor, Problmes d'interprdtation des dispositions de la
Convention 169 en Bolivie, 25 RECHERCHES AmiRiNDIENNES AU QUIBEC 72, 74-75 (1995);
CIDDEBENI, supra note 24.
28. See, e.g., Jay Martin, An Attorney's Perspective on Emerging New Venture
Opportunities for Petroleum Projects in Latin America, 33 ALTA. L. REV. 270, 273 (1995)
(citing studies that suggest the existence of significant hydrocarbons reserves in Bolivia
as well as in Ecuador and Peru.
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This increasing pressure on indigenous peoples' lands and
way of life was met with complete indifference and sometimes
active encouragement from the government.2 9 Thus, indigenous
people were forced to organize politically and, in August of 1990,
the peoples of the Beni department began a six hundred
kilometre "Marcha por el territorio y la dignidad" (March for
Territory and Dignity). Their principal demands included:
respect of their rights as Bolivian citizens; constitutional
recognition of their indigenous identities and cultures; and legal
recognition of their ancestral landsS0
The march had a major impact on Bolivian society: in an
unprecedented show of national solidarity, the Beni peoples were
joined by other lowlands indigenous peoples, Aymara and
Quechua people of the altiplano, as well as students from all
over the country.31 Following the march, the indigenous peoples
organized themselves on a regional level under the umbrella
organization called the Confederaci6n de Pueblos Indligenas del
Oriente, Chaco y Amazonia de Bolivia (recently renamed the
Confederaci6n de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia-CIDOB). The
solidarity demonstrated during the march to La Paz finally
convinced the government to take concrete steps to recognize and
guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples. A new cultural
dynamic had been introduced into Bolivia's previously class-
based political discourse.
Nevertheless, on the whole the reforms undertaken in the
wake of the march have been viewed as slow and insufficient by
CIDOB and the peoples it represents, particularly in relation to
the consolidation of land rights. Thus, in August 1996, another
march was undertaken in an attempt to force the government to
fulfill its promises to secure legal title to indigenous territories
as well as to consult indigenous peoples and their organizations
in good faith regarding issues such as oil operations in
indigenous territories.32
29. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 74.
30. Convention 169, supra note 11, at 11.
31. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 75.
32. The Bolivian newspaper La Presencia reported that the Ley del Instituto
Nacional de Reforma Agraria was passed on October 12. This fulfills one of
Confederaci6n de Pueblos Indigenas de Bolivia's (CIDOB) demands. However, it does not
actually consolidate legal title to lands, just new procedures for doing so. Further to
Resolution 216790 made by the President on Sept. 13, 1996, an inter-institutional
commission (National Agrarian Reform Institute, Secretariat of Ethnic Affairs, CIDOB)
[Vol. 29:3
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What is certain, however, is that despite their setbacks, the
indigenous peoples and their organizations have gained
considerable strength and experience and are now viewed as
important, if not yet very powerful, players in the national
political arena. Moreover, in their recent struggles, they have
taken strength from the broader indigenous movement which
has led to significant developments at the international level.
This international movement includes an early Draft
Declaration of Principles for the Defense of the Indigenous
Nations and Peoples of the Western Hemisphere, drawn up in
1977 by indigenous organizations.33 As evidence of the growing
State recognition of the special claims raised by indigenous
peoples throughout the world, the United Nations constituted a
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1983.
Numerous indigenous organizations have participated in
cooperation with Working Group members and state
representatives to produce a Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. 34 In 1993, the U.N. General Assembly
declared this to be the International Decade of Indigenous
Peoples. 35 The Organization of American States is currently
drafting an Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.36 Finally, the ILO has played an ongoing
role in raising awareness of issues relating to indigenous peoples
ever since the adoption of ILO Convention 107 in 1957.
B. The Legal Context
Despite this growing international momentum, however,
Bolivia's indigenous peoples remained highly marginalized prior
was to be created in order to develop and propose procedures for the identification,
consolidation, establishment of boundaries and title of the lands. CPTI, supra note 2, at
3. The process through which the rights will flow from this title remains unclear.
33. DRAFT DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE INDIGENOUS
NATIONS AND PEOPLES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Add.5, Annex 4).
34. DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES WGIP, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29, Annex 1 (1993) (final WGIP version) adopted by U.N.
Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N.G.A.
Res. 1994/45, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2 (1995) (currently under consideration by the
Commission on Human Rights) [hereinafter U.N. DRAFT DECL.J.
35. U.N.G.A. Res. 48/163 of 21 (1993), approved by Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, Feb. 26, 1997 (as found at: http://www.oas.org/EN/PROG/indigena.htm).
36. INTER-AM. DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.90/doc.14 rev.1 (1995) [hereinafter INTER-AM DRAFT DECL.].
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to the march in 1990. Until then, indigenous peoples of the
lowlands were referred to in laws as "pueblos selvdticos," or
jungle peoples, and were treated as legally incompetent.3 7 They
were generally excluded from political debate and activity. After
the march, however, significant legislative measures were taken
with regard to the land and constitutional rights of indigenous
peoples.
In 1991, the Bolivian parliament adopted the Ley 12573
which incorporates the ILO's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
Convention 169 into national law. There is no provision of the
Bolivian Constitution which deals expressly with the status of
international treaties in Bolivian law. However, when ratified
by Congress as national laws, they must be viewed as standing
at least equal to other ordinary laws within the legal hierarchy.
39
The ratified treaty also imposes an international obligation on
signatory countries to adjust their laws in order to ensure that
they conform to their international obligations.4
The Ley 1257/ILO 169 established the framework for much
of the constitutional reform which took place in 1994.41 For the
first time in Bolivian history, the Constitution included a
recognition in its first article of the "multicultural and
multiethnic" character of the Republic.42 An article was also
added which explicitly recognized the rights of indigenous
peoples, particularly in relation to their "tierras comunitarias de
origen" or collective ancestral lands.*3 Roughly translated,
Article 171 of the Constitution reads:
I. The social, economic and cultural rights of indigenous
peoples inhabiting national territory are hereby recognized,
affirmed and protected by law, especially as they relate to
their ancestral communal lands and the right to sustainable
37. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 74.
38. Ley 1257, supra note 12.
39. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 76-77. The hierarchy of legal norms in Bolivia is
therefore: Constitution, national laws (with those adopting international conventions
possibly standing superior among them), "decreto leyes" (laws passed under military
dictatorships without Congressional approval), supreme decrees (emitted by the
President, and usually used to regulate laws), resolutions, agreements, and so on.
40. Id. at 77.
41. Id.
42. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DEL ESTADO (as reformed by Ley de la Repfibhca No.
1585 de 12 de agosto de 1994, art. 1 [hereinafter CONST.].
43. CONST., art. 171.
[Vol. 29:3462
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use and exploitation of the natural resources therein, as well
as guaranteeing their identity, values, languages, customs and
institutions.
In addition, beginning in 1990, former President Jaime Paz
Zamora recognized certain indigenous territories by supreme
decree. By the end of 1992, the President had issued Supreme
Decrees recognizing eight indigenous territories." Decreto
Supremo 22610, for example, established a 12,000 square
kilometres indigenous territory basically within the boundaries
of an already existing national park spanning the border of the
Beni and Cochabamba Departments, 45 the Territorio Indigena-
Parque Nacional Isiboro-S~cure (TIPNIS).46 The area lies
between the Isiboro and S6cure rivers, and is home to about 4573
people living in forty-seven Mojefio, Yuracar6 and ChimAn
communities. 47
Third party property and concession rights which had been
obtained legally in the area at the time the decrees were issued
were protected in each of the decrees. In certain decrees, the
territories were recognized as inalienable, indivisible,
imprescribable and unencumberable property held collectively."
In sum, slowly but surely, a regime of enforceable legal
protection appeared to be emerging as a result of the 1996 march
and the negotiations to which it led.
C. The State of Oil Operations in Indigenous
Territories
Given these developments, indigenous peoples were shocked
when oil company employees appeared on their lands without
warning and attempted to lay seismic lines. The following is a
brief overview of the events leading up to attempts by indigenous
44. JUDITH MARINISSEN, LEGISLACION BOLrViANA Y PUEBLOS INDIGENAS 44 (1995).
45. Departmental jurisdiction over the Territorio Indigena-Parque Nacional Isiboro-
S~cure (TIPNIS) is actually an extremely hot topic of debate in and of itself between
various interested parties, including departmental authorities keen to ensure that oil
and gas discovered in the area be considered theirs. The indigenous communities living
in the park are caught in the middle of the debate and have not yet taken a definite side,
although their inclination seems to tend toward Beni.
46. Decreto Supremo 22610 (Oct. 10, 1990) (TIPNIS) GACETA OFICIAL DE BOLIVIA 6.
47. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 7.
48. Decreto Supremo 22611 (Oct. 10, 1990) (Area indigena-Regi6n de Chimanes)
GACETA OFICIAL DE BOLIVIA 13.
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peoples to defend their rights as defined under ILO 169. After a
first set of privatization reforms to oil and gas laws in 1990, the
state-run oil and gas company, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales
Bolivia (YPFB), entered into two major new risk service
agreements (contracts): one with BHP Petroleum (Bolivia) Inc.
and Pan Andean Resources PLC in 1993; and the other with
Repsol Exploraci6n S6cure, S.A. de la Paz, Bolivia (a consortium
formed by Repsol Espafia, ELF Hydrocarbures Bolivie de Paris,
BHP Bolivia and MAXUS Bolivia Inc.) in 1994.49 The first
contract granted exploration, exploitation and commercialization
rights in the "Chapare block" (covering an area of about 15,500
square kilometres) for a period of up to thirty years. The second,
signed in 1994, granted similar rights over the "S6cure block"
(covering an area of 15,000 square kilometres square
kilometres). In both cases, the exploration work has been sub-
contracted to Western Geophysical.5 The blocks overlap in part
with the following indigenous territories recognized by Supreme
Decree: TIPNIS, Territorio Yuqui, Territorio Indigena ChimAn
and Territorio Indligena Multi6tnico (TIM). These territories are
home to approximately 10,700 indigenous people. 5'
49. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 5. This marked the beginning of the gradual
privatization of the oil industry that has begun to occur in Bolivia. Nevertheless, even
under the newest Hydrocarbons Act, art. 11 states that exploration, exploitation,
transportation and distribution activities are all "national projects having a public utility
character that will take place under the protection of the State." Ley 1689 de
Hidrocarburos del 30 abril 1996. It therefore seems fairly clear that despite the partial
privatization of the hydrocarbons sector, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivia's
(YPFB) role will remain such that it should be considered an "organ of the government"
and therefore subject to state obligations under international and national law. In cases
concerning state immunity for "public" entities such as YPFB, the test for establishing
whether or not the body is entitled to immunity has sometimes been expressed in
international law as an inquiry into: a) the nature of the organ's functions as set out in
its enabling statute; b) the amount of control exerted by State departments over the
organ. For a leading decision on this point, see Trendtex v. Central Bank of Nigeria
[1977] 1 Q.B. 529 (C.A.); see also INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON
STATE RESPONSIBILITY, (1980) 2(11) Y.B. of the I.L.C., especially arts. 7 and 8). It seems
fairly certain that YPFB would satisfy this test, given that art. 14 states that "joint
venture contracts will be entered into by YPFB in the name of and as representative of
the State" and that, in general, YPFB is required to carry out a supervisory role with
respect to oil operations, in conjunction with appropriate government departments.
Thus, applying the logic of case law and the Draft Articles, one is led to conclude that
YPFB is a state organ and that its acts or omissions may entail Bolivia's responsibility
under international law.
50. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 6.
51. Id. at 7.
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When oil company employees appeared in the TIM (Chapare
Block) without notice in 1993, the indigenous peoples' local
territorial wardens set up a blockade and stopped the employees
from laying their seismic lines.52 When Repsol activities began
in the TIPNIS in May of 1995, again without any prior
consultation, the indigenous peoples in the territory threatened
to block the company's exploration work.53 A meeting took place
shortly thereafter between indigenous leaders and government
representatives, at which state officials acknowledged
consultations had not taken place prior to entering into the
contracts.5 4
At the meeting, a bi-partite commission (state-indigenous
peoples) was formed with the objective of determining a feasible
mechanism for the consultation and participation of indigenous
peoples with regard to oil operations on their territories.
Recognizing the need for expertise and assistance, CPIB, CIDOB
and their NGO advisors asked an Ecuadorian consultant
familiar with the experience of indigenous peoples relating to oil
operations in that country to assist them in drafting a proposal
to be submitted to the government.
The consultant produced a document based on ILO 169,
relevant Bolivian legislation and the lessons learned from the
Ecuadorian experience. Recommendations included that the
technical committee be made up of representatives of the
government secretariats responsible for energy, the environment
and "ethnic affairs," as well as of YPFB, CIDOB, CPIB and the
Guarani people's assembly. Each representative would have the
right to speak and to vote on all matters.
5
The committee would be assisted by "technical experts" from
the government and from indigenous organizations; its activities
would be funded by the moneys paid by contracting parties each
year under the terms of their contracts. The committee's
functions would include, inter alia:
- ensuring that all contracts included specific clauses on the
consultation and participation of indigenous peoples;
52. Meeting with Don Marcial Fabricano, President of CIDOB, and J. GonzAlez
Humpire of CEJIS in Santa Cruz, Bolivia (July 7, 1996).
53. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 1.
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. at 16-17.
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- proposing and designing environmental action plans and
an environmental regulation for the hydrocarbons sector;
• overseeing oil operations and ensuring that contracting
parties were complying with legal obligations set out in their
contracts and in national law, particularly with regard to the
environment, social and cultural impacts;
- promoting citizen participation in environmental
monitoring through educational campaigns;
- establishing a mechanism for participating in the
monetary benefits generated by oil operations; and
- quantifying equitable compensation for any potential
damages which might be incurred by indigenous peoples through
loss of material and natural property and goods.56
In the end, the government rejected these demands, stating
that they were potentially illegal57 and unconstitutional.58 In the
months following this meeting, CIDOB engaged in a process of
drafting a regulation specifically for oil operations in indigenous
territories. The draft regulation set out the proposals mentioned
above in somewhat greater detail.5i
The draft was given to representatives of the Hydrocarbons
Subsecretariat during a meeting held on July 8, 1996. A joint
commission to study the possibility of adopting such a regulation
was proposed. The commission was to consist of government,
World Bank and indigenous representatives. Although no joint
meetings had taken place by September 1996, the President of
Bolivia made a statement in reaction to the August 1996 march
that such a regulation would be adopted by supreme decree.0
Moreover, the World Bank recently hired a Canadian consultant
to draft this regulation.61
56. Id. at 14-18.
57. Contrary to the old Hydrocarbons Act, which did not contemplate citizen
participation in YPFB decisions.
58. Provisions for royalties were said to be contrary the Constitution (providing for
exclusive State ownership of sub-surface resources). CONST., art. 139.
59. CEJIS Trinidad, Borrador de Reglamento para Operaciones Petroleras en
Territorios Indigenas (Presented to the Hydrocarbons sector Sub-Secretariat on July 18,
1996) (unpublished, on file with author).
60. Interview with J. Daniel O'Rourke, consultant to the World Bank on the project
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The Bolivian government is therefore under significant
pressure from oil companies and the World Bank to establish
clear and definitive rules as soon as possible, in order to
guarantee a stable and certain climate in which to carry out the
operations.62 Meanwhile, exploration activities are proceeding.
In the S6cure block, seismic surveys are still taking place, with
TIPNIS wardens alleging that explosives are being detonated in
river-beds,63 a process which is known to be harmful to fish and
other river wildlife and is contrary to international oil industry
standards.64
Needless to say, indigenous peoples are frustrated and
concerned with their evident lack of control and influence over
the whole process. Largely due to the knowledge they have
gained through exchanges with Ecuadorian NGOs, indigenous
organizations have been able to make relatively coherent
proposals on this technical subject, despite their lack of training
and resources. Informed by this knowledge and related concerns
about the impact of oil operations on themselves and their
environment, they consider it crucial that their rights also be
acknowledged and set out in clear terms, in order to guarantee
their protection in the midst of all these pressures. The
principal source of their rights, in their view, is ILO 169.
III. EVALUATION OF WHETHER BOLIVIA IS CURRENTLY IN
BREACH OF ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDER
PARAGRAPH 15(2) OF ILO 169
ILO 169 and its predecessor, ILO 107, are the two principal
international conventions currently in force that deal specifically
with the rights of indigenous peoples. ILO 169 replaces ILO 107
wherever States choose to ratify the more recent Convention.65
ILO 169 is divided into ten parts, which include, among
others: General Policy, Land, Employment Conditions and
Contracts, Social Security and Health, Education and
62. Meeting with Ingeniero Umberto Toledo, Hydrocarbons Sector Sub-Secretariat
(July 8, 1996).
63. Oral report from territorial warden, Youci Fabricano, at the XV Encuentro de
Corregidores y Representantes del TIPNIS in San Miguel (July 31 to Aug. 7 1996).
64. These international standards are reflected in the new Environmental
Regulations for the Hydrocarbons Sector. Decreto Supremo 24335 (July 19, 1996), art.
42(a) (prohibiting such activities).
65. ILO 169, art. 36.
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Communication. I will focus only on the first two parts of the
Convention, and in particular on Articles 6, 7, 14, and 15
concerning indigenous peoples' rights with respect to existing
natural resources pertaining to their lands.
Article 15(2), the key paragraph for our purposes, sets out
the following rights for indigenous peoples in countries where
the State claims ownership of subsoil resources such as
petroleum and natural gas:
2. In cases in which the State retains the ownership of
mineral or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources
pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples,
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their
interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation
of such resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples
concerned shall wherever possible participate in the benefits
of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of such
activities. 66
To summarize, then, Article 15(2) sets out the following
obligations for each signatory State:
" the obligation to consult indigenous peoples;
" the obligation to ensure participation by indigenous
peoples wherever possible in the benefits of resource exploitation
activities; and
- the obligation to compensate whenever any damages are
sustained by these peoples.
As mentioned above, ILO 169 was ratified and adopted into
Bolivian law in 1991.67 Bolivia's international obligations under
the Convention therefore came into force in 1992.68 The context
66. ILO 169, art. 15(2).
67. As stated supra note 11, Bolivia ratified the Convention in July of 1991 with the
deposit of its instrument of ratification: Ley de Is Repfblica No. 1257 del 11 de julio 1991.
It is important to note that the ILO does not accept reservations to its conventions.
CONST., art. 19, § 5(d) (1994).
68. The Convention stipulates that the treaty comes into force twelve months after
the date on which its ratification has been registered. ILO 169, art. 38(3).
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and facts outlined above will serve as an underlying point of
reference for our analysis of Bolivia's performance with respect
to the obligations set out in ILO 169 regarding sub-surface
resources pertaining to indigenous lands.
First, we will consider the applicability of ILO 169 to the
peoples of the Bolivian Amazon region. Having determined that
the peoples of Bolivia have been entitled to protection under the
Convention since 1992, we will examine each of the obligations
created by Article 15(2) and other relevant provisions of ILO 169
in order to determine whether the Bolivian government has
breached or is currently in breach of its treaty obligations.
The Convention is still very new. Thus, any attempt to
determine the standards set by ILO 169 must necessarily be
somewhat speculative. These standards may be derived in part
from an exercise in interpretation, similar to that which may be
undertaken by an ILO Committee of Experts on the Application
of Conventions and Recommendations. We will rely on the
recognition that:
[T]reaties, unlike works of literature, embody a commitment
to a distinctive process of interpretation.... In entering into a
treaty, a State binds itself not only to the terms of the
instrument (however interpreted) but also to a process of
intersubjective interpretation: the interpretive task is to
ascertain what the text means to the parties collectively
rather than to each individually. The activities and
perspectives of the interpretive communities associated with
this enterprise render treaty auto-interpretation something
other than the exercise of unilateral political will.69
In the absence of any authoritative judicial interpretations of the
Convention, recourse must be had to various sources, or
"interpretive communities."
In his work on the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (Vienna Convention),70 I.M. Sinclair noted that
approaches to interpretation "are commonly said to reflect the
69. Ian Johnstone, Treaty Interpretation: The Authority of Interpretive
Communities, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 380-81 (1991).
70. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,




subjective (or 'intentions of the parties') approach, the objective
(or 'textuar) approach and the teleological (or 'object and
purpose') approach. They are not, of course, mutually
exclusive."'71 Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention codify
these approaches. They also include subsequent State practice
in the application of the treaty as an important interpretive
source, as well as recourse to supplementary means of
interpretation such as preparatory works and the circumstances
of the conclusion of the treaty in cases of ambiguity or absurdity.
The analysis which follows will therefore use the methods
outlined above in order to arrive at a more sophisticated
understanding of the standards established by Article 15(2). The
textual and purposive approaches will be used to suggest a
preliminary understanding of the normative content of Article
15(2).72 We will then make a detailed analysis of State practice.
This will be done in two stages: first, we will consider current
legislation and practice in various countries, both signatory and
not, of ILO 169. We will then consider provisions similar to
Article 15(2) found in two more recent instruments: the U.N.
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 73 and the
draft Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.74 These drafts are still far from gaining unanimous
approval from States. However, they may be examined as
potential sources of international opinio juris converging around
certain minimal standards75
71. I. M. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 70-71 (1973).
72. These approaches tend to be used "in the field of general multilateral
conventions, particularly those of the social, humanitarian and law-making type." ILO
169 is multilateral and is also "social" in that it seeks to create norms regarding state
interaction with indigenous peoples within their territories. See generally G. G.
Fitzmaurice, 77w Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty
Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INV'L L. 1 (1951).
73. U.N. DRAFT DECL., supra note 34.
74. INTER-AM DRAFT DECL., supra note 36.
75. See ANAYA, supra note 15, at 50. Anaya asserts that a "pull toward compliance"
evidenced in explicit communications by States may bring about a "convergence of
understanding and expectation about rule...even in advance of a widespread
corresponding pattern of physical conduct." Id. This fairly flexible understanding of the
norm-generating process might be contested in light of the stricter tests posited in the
opinions given in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.)
1969 ICJ 3 (Feb. 20), still a leading authority on this question. For the purposes of our
argument, however, it is not necessary to show that customary norms equivalent to those
found in ILO 169 exist, unless Bolivia for some reason attempts to evade its treaty
obligations, in which case a tribunal would presumably apply the reasoning of the
International Court of Justice that treaty law and customary international law "retain a
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Finally, where possible, the views of indigenous peoples will
also be considered. Indigenous peoples are part of the
interpretive community which has been working to establish
international norms for state relations with indigenous peoples.
They have played a key role at the United Nations Working
Group on Indigenous Populations, which opened its doors to
participation by many indigenous organizations in its work on
setting standards for state conduct at the international level.76
They are also the most direct beneficiaries under these
international instruments, and appear to have gained a measure
of international legal personality in the process of their
development.
In using all of these interpretive tools, we will endeavour to
establish a relatively detailed appreciation of the standards set
out in ILO 169 with respect to the consultation, benefit and
compensation of indigenous peoples wherever their lands are
subject to development programs for sub-surface resources.
The objective is, in part, to assert that Bolivia has breached
certain obligations under the Convention. Perhaps more
importantly, however, this article seeks to provide insight into
the types of legal and administrative arrangements which would
satisfy both the spirit and the letter of ILO 169.
A. The Applicability of ILO 169
Article 1 of the Convention states that it applies to:
a) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country... at the time of conquest or
colonisation... and who, irrespective of their legal status,
retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and
political institutions.
b) Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded
as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to
which the provisions of this Convention apply.
separate existence." Military Activities in and Against Nicaragua 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14,
para. 175. However, the draft declarations are helpful as a means of showing the
emergence of a developing consensus regarding the more specific content of the norms
found in ILO 169.
76. ANAYA, supra note 15, at 51.
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ILO 169 is one of few international instruments that include
a definition of the term "peoples." In her historical overview of
the definition of indigenous peoples, Chairperson-Rapporteur
Erica-Irene A. Daes noted that the Convention picks up the
elements of "distinctiveness" and descent from the pre-conquest
inhabitants of a territory in its definition.77 The definition also
emphasizes the requirement of self-identification, generally
viewed as being the key element by indigenous peoples
themselvesy8
The ILO 169 definition does not make express mention,
however, of two other elements identified by Special Rapporteur
Martinez Cobo: that indigenous peoples "form at present non-
dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve,
develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories.., as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples. 79 The special relationship between indigenous peoples
and their territory has been emphasized repeatedly. It also
raises one of the most controversial elements from the
perspective of governments, who have continually resisted any
notion of indigenous "territory" which they fear may have
implications under international law for State sovereignty.8D
State parties have also resisted the use of the term "peoples"
due to the potential implications of the term for self-
determination under Article 1 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),s' among other international
instruments. Nevertheless, the use of "peoples" instead of
"populations" gained acceptance among States over the course of
the revision of ILO 107,82 particularly given the new
Convention's express statement that the term "peoples" as used
77. E.-I. A. Daes, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2IAC.4/1996/2 (1996) at 10.
78. Id. at 12. Articlel(2) of the Inter-American Draft Declaration includes the
element of self-identification as a fundamental criterion for determining the peoples to
which the Declaration will apply. INTER-AM DRAFT DECL., supra note 36. Interestingly,
however, the U.N. Draft Declaration makes no mention of this criterion. U.N. DRAFT
DECL., supra note 34.
79. See supra, note 77, atlO (emphasis added).
80. See id. at 16 (reviewing documents declaring the historical relationship between
indigenous people and their lands, including the Martinez Cobo Report, the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development's Agenda 21, and the International
Conference on Population and Development in 1994. See ANAYA, supra note 15, at 53 for
a brief discussion of State concerns regarding the use of the word "territory."
81. Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976).
82. ANAYA, supra note 15, at 49.
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in ILO 169 "shall not be construed as having any implications as
regards the rights which may attach to the term under
international law."88
Two cases brought before the Human Rights Committee
under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR illustrate conflicting
views over the use of the terms "peoples" and "territories." In
both the Mi'kmaq Case,8 4and Ominayak v. Canada,85 the Human
Rights Committee heard competing claims regarding the status
of the Mi'kmaq and Lubicon bands as "peoples." The authors of
the communications asserted that they were peoples,
emphasizing their immemorial occupation of large areas of land,
their distinctive identity and, in the Mi'kmaq case, their
conclusion of treaties as "free and independent nations" with
French and British colonial authorities.86 The Canadian
government asserted that in neither case were the authors
"peoples" as contemplated by the ICCPR, saying that the
Mi'kmaq were a "thinly scattered minority dispersed among the
majority,"87 while the Lubicon Lake Band comprised only "one of
582 bands in Canada and a small portion of a larger group of
Cree Indians residing in Northern Alberta."88
In both cases, the Committee found that it could not
consider a "people's" claim to self-determination under the
Optional Protocol.89 Thus, the question of whether the authors
were peoples was not decided on the merits. It is submitted,
however, that the Canadian government's reasoning was at the
83. ILO 169, art. 1(3); ANAYA, supra note 15, at 31. The International Labour
Office has stated on repeated occasions that it is outside the competence of a labour-
focused international organization to determine the general meaning in international
law of the term "peoples." ILO, General Conference, 76th Sess. Report IV(2): Partial
Revision of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention 1957 (No. 107) 12
(1989)[hereinafter ILO Rep. IV(2)].
84. Mi'kmaq Tribal Society v. Canada (No. 205/1986), U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC391DI205I1986 (1990) (decision on admissibility).
85. Ominayak & the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (No. 167/1984), U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/381D/167/1984 (Human Rights Committee decision released Mar. 26, 1990).
86. Orninayak at para. 2.2 & Mi'kmaq, at para. 2.1.
87. Mi'kmaq at para. 4.3.
88. Ominayak at para. 6.2.
89. Mikmaq at para. 14.2 and Ominayak at para. 13.3. In both cases, the
Committee used almost identical words. In Mi'kmaq, the Committee stated that while
article 1 of the Covenant recognizes and protects in the most resolute terms a people's
right to self-determination and its right to dispose of its natural resources, as an
essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights
and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights, this provision can neither be
invoked by individuals, nor by peoples, under the Optional Protocol.
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very least problematic, given that it used a colonial-imposed
mode of organization (the reserve system) to defeat the claims of
these groups. Thus, these arguments should not be viewed as
persuasive, although they undoubtedly point out some of the
strategic concerns facing indigenous peoples in the event that a
group representing only one part of a recognized "ethnic group"
attempts to bring a claim for a breach of its rights under
international law.
Despite these definitional problems, however, the peoples of
the Bolivian Amazon Basin region appear to fall quite clearly
within the ILO's definition of indigenous peoples. As outlined in
Part II of this paper, their oral history of pre-colonial occupation
of the lands in question has been confirmed by archeological
evidence such as ceramics and a system of ridges and plateaux,
thought to have been constructed by communities in order to
allow villages and their crops to survive the rain and flood
season. 90 Jesuit "reduction" of these peoples permanently altered
their modes of social organization and religious beliefs.
Nevertheless, they have retained their own languages and are
currently organized based on the "cabildo" political structure.
This structure was imposed by the Jesuits, but has now become
a distinct form of social organization characteristic of the
lowlands indigenous peoples. Moreover, the cabildos provided
the political and social base from which the current regional
indigenous organizations, such as the Central de Pueblos
Indigenas del Beni, were born.91 Most importantly, as may be
gathered from the name of their organization, these peoples
identify themselves as "indigenous."
On the basis of history, culture, political structures and,
above all, self-identification, the peoples of the Bolivian Amazon
Basin region should be viewed as entitled to benefit from the
rights set out in ILO 169.
90. A Trinidad-based Bolivian NGO, CIDDEBENI, has done a great deal of work on
compiling and completing archeological surveys of the area. Their Plan Preliminar de
Manejo Territorio Indigena Parque Nacional Isiboro Sdcure provides a good overview of
the pre-Columbian and missionary periods in the history of the region. See CIDDEBENI,
supra note 24. See also MACHICADO, supra note 19, at 51-53.
91. CIDDEBENI, supra note 24, at 8-10.
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B. The Obligation to Consult
Indigenous peoples around the world have been calling for
many years for the respect of their rights to control the natural
resources pertaining to their land.92 In their struggle with
governments over the form this control should take, various
solutions have been suggested. They range from full ownership
rights and therefore complete control, to "co-management" of
resources, to procedural guarantees of involvement in a
consultation process. 93
Many indigenous groups argue for the first or second option,
in light of the consequences they have experienced and witnessed
wherever indigenous peoples have been subjected to sudden and
uncontrolled contact with outsiders. The Yanomami in Brazil in
particular have caught the world's attention, given the obvious
threats that contact with gold miners and other outsiders posed
for their very survival, when their ancestral lands were opened
up as part of the construction relating to a large-scale
Amazonian development project. 94
One need not look to Latin America to get a sense of the
magnitude of the problem. Canadian examples are powerful
enough: in the Ominayak Case brought before the Human Rights
Committee, the court recognized that the expropriation of the
lands of a traditionally isolated and self-sufficient community for
the purposes of oil and gas exploitation "threatened the way of
life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band."95
The recent U.N. Draft Declaration enshrines the response of
indigenous peoples today: they will accept nothing less than the
right to give "full and informed consent" to development
activities on their lands.96 The protection offered by Article 15(2)
of ILO 169, however, does not provide such protection. Rather,
where States such as Bolivia retain ownership of sub-surface
resources, the right guaranteed under ILO 169 is procedural, not
substantive: a right to be consulted, not a right to give or
withhold consent. We recall again the wording of Article 15(12):
92. See, e.g., Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 57.
93. WGIP, Report of the Expert Seminar on Practical Experience Regarding
Indigenous Land Rights and Claims, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/6 at 18.
94. Anaya, supra note 15, at 159.
95. See Ominayak.
96. U.N. Draft Declaration, supra note 34, art. 30.
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In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral
or sub-surface resources or rights to other resources
pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain
procedures through which they shall consult these peoples,
with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their
interests would be prejudiced, before undertaking or
permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation
of such resources pertaining to their lands.
97
This norm is expressed in relatively general language in ILO
169. Evaluating whether or not Bolivia is in breach of its
obligations requires a more specific understanding of the
standards which have been set by the Convention, supplemented
by international customary law.98 Thus, I will attempt to
determine the extent of the protection offered by this right; that
is, the minimum standard for state compliance with ILO 169.
First, a textual analysis of Article 15 will explore the content of
the provision. We will then consider the overarching "good faith"
obligation found in Article 6 of the Convention. The discussion
will then turn to relevant state practice. Finally, Bolivia's
conduct with respect to the obligation to consult indigenous
peoples regarding the exploration and exploitation of sub-surface
resources pertaining to their lands will be considered.
1. Textual Analysis Using a Purposive Approach
Article 15(1) of ILO 169 contemplates the right of indigenous
peoples to participate in the use, administration, and
conservation of natural resources pertaining to their lands and
stipulates that these rights shall be "specially safeguarded." As
set out above, Article 15(2) sets out much more limited rights
cases where the State claims ownership of subsoil resources such
as petroleum and natural gas.
Article 15(2) relates to the timing of consultations, which
must take place prior to the opening up of indigenous lands to
exploration or exploitation. It also sets out the subject-matter
97. ILO 169, art. 15(12).
98. S. James Anaya has recently posited the "existence of customary norms
concerning indigenous peoples and their pull toward compliance," that is, both opinio
juris and state practice providing evidence of a "new and emergent international law of
indigenous peoples," based on his survey of international instruments and state practice
with regard to indigenous peoples. See ANAYA, supra note 15, at 57.
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for the consultations: the extent to which the interests of
indigenous peoples would be prejudiced by proposed programs.
On its own, however, the article provides little guidance as to
how the consultations must be conducted, nor does it offer
precise indications of the various types of interests which might
be prejudiced.
According to the general principles of treaty interpretation
as codified in art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, ILO 169 must be interpreted "in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context."99 Several additional articles of the
Convention provide important context for the interpretation and
application of Article 15(2).
Part I of the Convention is entitled "General Policy." Thus,
its articles may be understood to provide the overarching norms
which will govern the interpretation and application of ILO 169.
Moreover, the International Labour Office has itself emphasized
that articles 6 and 7 of the Convention "are central to the way
the Convention should be applied."100 Article 6 reads:
1. In applying the provisions of this Convention,
governments shall: Consult the peoples concerned, through
appropriate procedures and in particular, whenever
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative
measures through their representative institutions which may
affect them directly....
2. The consultations carried out in application of this
Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a form
appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of
achieving agreement or consent to the proposed measures.'10
This article therefore provides guidance as to the objectives
of the consultation process and the manner in which they shall
be carried out: through representative institutions, in good faith
and with the objective of achieving agreement or consent.
Art. 7(1) states the general principle that indigenous peoples
shall have the right to "exercise control, to the extent possible,
over their own economic, social and cultural development. In
99. Vienna Convention, supra note 70, art. 31(1) (emphasis added).
100. ILO GUIDE, supra note 11, at 10.
101. ILO 169, art. 6 (emphasis added).
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addition, they shall participate in the formulation,
implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for
national and regional development which may affect them
directly."
Thus, in the cases contemplated by Article 15(2) in which
indigenous peoples are not considered to own sub-surface
resources pertaining to their lands, the consultation process
must be used to enable them to exercise some control over, and
participate in, decisions made respecting development plans on
their lands and therefore which affect them directly. Finally,
Article 7(3) adds that "governments shall ensure that, whenever
appropriate, studies are carried out, in co-operation with the
peoples concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and
environmental impact on them of planned development
activities."
Oil and gas operations are generally large scale development
projects having a major social and environmental impact. They
therefore arguably require the maximum measures of protection
offered by these various provisions. In sum, the text of the
Convention requires the following conditions to be met regarding
the development of sub-surface oil and gas resources pertaining
to indigenous lands:
• Consultations must take place in good faith.
* They must be carried out in the objective of achieving
agreement or consent.
- Consultations must take place prior to opening the lands
to development.
- They must provide as much control as possible and
participation in decisions regarding such development projects.
- They must consider the extent to which the interests of
indigenous people will be prejudiced and the social, spiritual,
cultural and environmental impact activities will have.
These conditions provide a general outline of the standard
for consultation. It is true that Article 34 of the Convention1
02
recognizes that States must be given a good deal of flexibility in
102. ' The nature and scope of the measures to be taken to give effect to this
Convention shall be determined in a flexible manner, having regard to the conditions
characteristic of each country." ILO 169, art. 34.
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the way in which they carry out their obligations. It is
submitted, however, that while this norm is "open-textured," to
use the words of H. L. A. Hart, there are still certain types of
behaviour that will fall outside its scope. 10 3 The provisions
establish that the obligation to consult requires more than mere
formalistic compliance. Requesting comments from indigenous
peoples without adequate mechanisms to ensure that the
comments can be prepared on an informed basis, or without
providing any assurance that their views will be taken seriously
will not satisfy the treaty provisions.
However, Article 6(2) also clearly allows governments to act
without the consent of indigenous peoples affected by its
decisions, provided some form of consultation has taken place.
The obligation imposed must therefore lie somewhere between
purely pro forma consultation and a veto right for indigenous
peoples over resource development on their lands.104
The purposive approach to treaty interpretation provides
additional interpretive guidance. The body of the treaty, as well
as its preamble and the preparatory works of the International
Labour Organisation, make it clear that the purpose of these
provisions generally is to provide for effective participation by
indigenous peoples in decisions made regarding their land.105
Above all, the obligation to consult may be viewed purposively as
a procedural mechanism which seeks to ensure that States cease
treating indigenous peoples in the assimilationist and
paternalistic manner of the past.106
It is interesting to note that Latin American judges on the
I.C.J. have played an important role in advancing the use of the
purposive approach to the interpretation of the U.N. Charter and
other conventions "seeking to regulate matters of social or
humanitarian interest with a view to improving the position of
individuals" such as the Genocide Convention, as opposed to
103. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124 (1961).
104. It is important to note, however, that while a veto right for indigenous peoples
would fall outside the standard set by para. 6(2), the Convention does not prohibit such
behaviour. Art. 35 of the Convention states that "the application of the provisions of this
Convention shall not adversely affect rights and benefits of the peoples concerned
pursuant to other Conventions and Recommendations, international instruments,
treaties or national laws, awards, custom or agreements." In the Bolivian case, however,
no right of veto has been provided by means of additional instruments.
105. 110 Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 18-19.
106. Id. at 18.
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conventions seeking to regulate the behaviour of states inter
se.107 Although these opinions were often given in dissent and go
further than the more widely accepted maxim that "the treaty
must have effect rather than be of no avail,"108 they provide a
compelling basis for employing a purposive approach, as well as
the textual approach and state practice, where a treaty is clearly
drafted in response to historical inequities perpetrated against
individuals (or peoples) by the signatories to the treaty
themselves, rather than as a consequence of a bargain between
state parties designed solely to regulate their own interactions.
While the purposive approach can provide a helpful guide to
the types of state conduct which will satisfy the obligations set
out in ILO 169, it must be complemented by an understanding of
the actual procedural mechanisms which will tend to meet these
general standards. We will look to state practice to find evidence
of the actual application of the obligation to consult and the
standards such practice sets with respect to para. 15(2) of the
Convention.
Before doing so, however, it will be recalled that the Bolivian
government did not consult indigenous peoples at all prior to
signing joint venture contracts in 1993 and 1994 with various
multinational oil companies and granting them exploration
blocks partially superimposed on indigenous territories
recognized by supreme decree.09 This must be viewed as a
flagrant violation by Bolivia of the most basic, plain meaning
interpretation of its obligation to consult indigenous peoples
under ILO 169, which, as noted above, came into force for Bolivia
in 1992.
In the Legal Consequences Case concerning South Africa's
role as former Mandatory of South West Africa, the I.C.J. found
that where an ongoing breach of an independent legal obligation
(to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms for all) could
be shown to have taken place, there was no need for the
complainants to show in addition that the defendant was acting
in bad faith.110
107. A. T. Leonhard, The Teleological Approach to Treaty Interpretation, in DE LEGE
PACTORUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT REMBERT WILSON 163 (D. Deener ed., 1970).
108. Id. at 166.
109. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 9.
110. J. F. O'CONNOR, GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 97(1991).
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It may be argued that the signing of two contracts in 1993
and 1994 was not an "ongoing breach" as understood in the Legal
Consequences Case. If it does constitute a sufficiently serious
breach of the obligation to consult to warrant similar analysis,
however, then the good or bad faith of Bolivia at the time is
irrelevant and cannot be held up by the state to defeat potential
claims by the indigenous peoples of the Amazon basin region.
If these arguments are accepted, Bolivia should be viewed as
having breached its obligations under the Convention on two
separate occasions (1993 and 1994). These breaches may be
reported to the ILO, as will be discussed below. For the
purposes of our analysis, however, it is interesting to consider
measures taken since that time by the Bolivian government in
relation to its obligations under ILO 169. These measures
include: signing an agreement with indigenous representatives
providing for a very limited type of consultation procedure,"' and
adopting new Environmental Regulations for the Hydrocarbons
Sector, which establish the environmental impact assessment
and consultation processes to be used in the case of oil and gas
operations on Bolivian territory in general.112 In order to assess
whether these measures satisfy the Convention's stipulations,
we will consider them in light of the textual interpretation
outlined above, and also of the overarching good faith principle
and state practice detailed below.
2. Good Faith
Under international law, States are bound to perform their
treaty obligations "in good faith."1 The evolution of this
principle of international law in State practice and doctrinal
writings from Roman times to the present has been traced by J.
F. O'Connor in his recent work entitled Good Faith in
International Law.114 After reviewing the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice and other international
arbitration decisions, he suggests the following definition of the
111. Acta con el prop6sito de buscar soluciones a problemas ambientales relacionados
con actividades del sector petrolero en Territorios Indigenas (Sept. 18, 1995) (copy
obtained from CEJIS Trinidad and on file with author) (hereinafter Acta sobre
actividades del sector petrolero en Territorios Indigenas].
112. Decreto Supremo 24335, supra note 64.
113. Vienna Convention, art. 26.




The principle of good faith in international law is a
fundamental principle from which the rule pacta sunt
servanda and other legal rules distinctively and directly
related to honesty, fairness and reasonableness are derived,
and the application of these rules is determined at any
particular time by the compelling standards of honesty,
fairness and reasonableness prevailing in the international
community at that time.115
With respect to the application of treaties, O'Connor's review of
relevant jurisprudence suggests that the good faith obligation
has been used to judge the exercise by States of their rights, as
well as the performance of their obligations. It is this latter
point which is of particular concern with respect to ILO 169,
since the I.C.J. has shown its willingness to use the good faith
principle as an interpretive source for supplementary guidelines
where a general legal obligation is found to exist in international
law.
Reference by the I.C.J. to the good faith principle in the
context of State obligations was made in both the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases and the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases,11s
after the Court found that the States in question had a legal
(rather than moral) duty to negotiate. 117 In the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, the Court held that it could use the
principle of good faith to justify the basic principle that
negotiations had to be meaningful, and not merely a formality.118
Moreover, in both cases, the International Court provided
practical guidelines for the parties concerning the means by
which negotiations should take place, including the particular
issues to be taken into account during the negotiations.119
Thus, according to international law, Bolivia must perform
its legal obligations under ILO 169 in good faith; that is, it must
act with the honesty, fairness and reasonableness that the
principle requires. It is true that the obligation to consult
115. Id.
116. Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (UK. & N. Ireland v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
117. Id.
118. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J., at 46-47.
119. O'CONNOR, supra note 110, at 95-96. The Court did not, however, proceed to
outline other procedural mechanisms such as frequency of negotiation meetings.
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indigenous peoples is different from the obligation of one State to
negotiate with another State, since indigenous peoples are in the
position of third party beneficiaries under ILO 169. On this
logic, however, indigenous peoples should also be viewed as the
expressly designated third party beneficiaries of the obligation to
perform in good faith owed by each signatory State to the others.
Furthermore, and to remove all possible doubts on this matter,
the Convention itself stipulates at Article 6 that "the
consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall
be undertaken, in good faith...."120
It is therefore submitted that the obligation to act in good
faith must be viewed as the overarching norm governing the
interpretation and application of the obligation to "establish or
maintain procedures through which they shall consult"
indigenous peoples found in Article 15(2). Although "good faith"
cannot in and of itself be the source of obligations, it must be
used as an important supplementary source for judging whether
particular procedural mechanisms satisfy the obligation to
consult found in Article 15(2) of ILO 169.
3. Consultation Procedures: State Practice
In order to narrow the scope of the wide range of
possibilities left open by Article 15(2) and other relevant
provisions, it is instructive to refer to state practice to determine
if there currently exists an international model for consultation
processes and, if so, what are its key components. The ILO has
already compiled reports from the signatory countries to ILO 169
regarding the activities they have undertaken in light of the
obligations imposed on them by the Convention. Beginning with
the Latin American signatories, Colombia, Mexico and
Guatemala appear to be in the early stages of establishing
institutional representation and procedures for the consultation
of indigenous peoples. The Colombian Constitution guarantees
indigenous representation in Congress.121 The government has
recognized Indigenous Territories as territorial entities,
governed by councils who have some powers of self-government
120. ILO 169, art. 6.
121. Representation through the election of two indigenous members in several
"special constituencies," which are similar to reserves. See ILO GUIDE, supra note 11, at
12.
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and who must participate in decisions taken by the government
with respect to the exploitation of natural resources on their
land. 122 In an earlier report, Colombia also indicated that it had
adopted a national development programme for Indigenous
Populations, whose administrative structure included a National
Indigenous Council composed of delegates from regional and
national indigenous organizations.23 Mexico reported that the
state retains ownership of mineral, sub-surface and other
resources pertaining to land. Any exploration or exploitation in
ejidos or comunidades inhabited by indigenous people is subject,
however, to the "authorization" of the affected communities.124
In Guatemala, the most recent party to ratify ILO 169, the
recent Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous
Peoples contains provisions to establish a bilateral commission
made up of equal numbers of government and indigenous
representatives.125
The Commission will be charged with supervising the
implementation of the Agreement which covers political,
economic, social and cultural rights. More specifically, the
Commission may consider reforms or measures regarding: the
establishment of obligatory mechanisms for consultation where
legislative or administrative measures are being considered and
will affect indigenous peoples; forms of institutional
participation in decision-making processes such as technical or
consultative agencies ensuring a permanent dialogue between
indigenous peoples and state organs; and measures to ensure
that individuals of indigenous origin may be promoted through
bureaucratic structures. 26
In Costa Rica, some form of institutionalized consultation of
indigenous peoples has existed for over a decade. Reports made
during the 1980s (under ILO 107) stated that the Government
had adopted comprehensive programs for development of an
122. Id. at 16.
123. ILO Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 22.
124. Id. at 19.
125. Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Guat.-Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (MINUGUA)), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex 1,
Agenda item 42, U.N. Doc. A/49/882.S/19951256/Annex 1 (1995).
126. Id., part D art. 5. In the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the
Agrarian Situation, the government has also undertaken a commitment to ensure
participation through "urban and rural development councils" wherever matters affecting
indigenous peoples arise. [MINUGUA site as found at [http://www.un.org/Dept/
minugualpa28.htm.]]
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"indigenous policy" after "full consultation" with representatives
of indigenous peoples. 127
In some signatory countries, however, there has been little
development in terms of representation and consultation. In
Paraguay, legislation passed in the 1980s established the
National Indian Institute, the official agency responsible for the
administration of Indian affairs. The Institute was to have a
consultative board comprised of government officials as well as
non-governmental representatives from indigenista, church and
other organizations but not indigenous organizations
themselves. 128
Among non-signatory countries, Panama has shown the
most willingness to establish consultative mechanisms for the
country's indigenous peoples by way of a form of co-management
of their lands as wildlife parks.129 In 1988, Brazil reported
significant changes in the structure of the National Indian
Foundation (FUNAI), after the ILO Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations indicated a
need for remedying the "dangers of paternalism" within the
FUNAI and for consultation with indigenous peoples.130 In 1994,
Brazil reported to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples
(UNGWIP) that under Aricle 231 of its Constitution (amended in
1988), rights to the exploitation of mineral resources existing in
indigenous areas will be effective only after authorization from
the National Congress pursuant to public hearings, "taking into
account the interests of the affected communities."131 During
these hearings, indigenous representatives may state their
concerns.13 2 There is no evidence, however, that any consultative
127. ILO Rep. IV(2), supra note 83, at 22.
128. Id. at 23.
129. In Panama, indigenous peoples have significant control over their territories (in
particular over the Kuna Yala Wildlands Park); this means they have greater control
over development activities on their lands than is provided by a right to consultation.
U.N. SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF
MINORITIES, TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONS ON THE LANDS OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/54 at 25-29 [hereinafter TRANSNAT'L
INVESTMENTS]. Furthermore, the state has engaged in negotiations with indigenous
peoples concerning proposals to establish a major copper mining project within reserve
lands. ILO Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 58.
130. TRANSNAT'L INVESTMENTS, supra note 129, at 21.
131. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.411994/2 at 7-8 (1994).
132. INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS,
BRAZIL: AN OVERVIEW 5 (1995) (unpublished, on file with author).
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mechanisms have been set up specifically to consider the
interests of indigenous peoples in the Congress or in FUNAI.13
In Ecuador, despite the publicity generated by NGOs such as
Acci6n Ecol6gica and indigenous organizations regarding the
destruction of Amazon rainforest by oil companies and others,
the government has not agreed to any consultation processes or
granting any special rights of control to indigenous peoples over
their lands.134 Notwithstanding reports of significant changes in
its policies with regard to indigenous peoples, 135 at the UNGWIP,
Argentina has indicated that it does not agree with provisions of
the UN Draft Declaration requiring consultation with respect to
subsoil resources, given that they are national property.138
Venezuela has generally stated that it does not support
provisions which give any special rights or greater autonomy for
indigenous peoples as opposed to other citizens.37 Moreover, the
country's mining legislation makes no provision for consultations
with indigenous peoples where concessions are to be granted on
or affecting their lands. 13
In sum, there currently exists a significant range of state
practice with respect to the consultation of indigenous peoples in
Latin America. In certain countries, consultation procedures do
not appear to exist at all (Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela).
In others, consultation tends to be done through governmental
agencies, the "Indian Institutes" (Brazil, Paraguay) with their
significant legacies of paternalism and tendency to "consult" by
way of employing indigenous people, rather than setting up any
procedures to consult indigenous organizations. In some
133. In response to complaints regarding the highly destructive impact that gold
miners have had on Yanomami territory, President Collor de Mello signed a decree
forbidding mineral prospecting on this land. Again, however, no provisions were made
for consultation with indigenous peoples of the area, in part because, in the opinion of the
government, at least, these peoples do not have sufficient experience or knowledge to
participate in consultations regarding their rights. Id. at 10.
134. INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS,
ECUADOR: AN OVERVIEW (1995) (unpublished, on file with author).
135. ILO Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 22. In 1988, Argentina reported that
indigenous communities would be granted separate legal personality, new land
adjudication provisions were being adopted, and bilingual education would be provided.
The government also established a National Institute for Indigenous Affairs which was to
"operate with the participation of representatives of the communities concerned." Id.
136. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2AC.4/1990/1 at 7 (1990).
137. Id. at 15.
138. Rend Kuppe, The Legal Fight for Land in Venezuela, 4 IWGIA NEWSL. 4, 8
(1993).
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countries, a certain level of political participation is guaranteed
through reserved seats in Congress and some powers of local
self-government and control over natural resources (Colombia,
Panama). Guatemala's recent Agreements have the potential to
go the furthest toward institutionalizing regular consultation
with indigenous organizations. The process has only just begun,
however, so the details regarding procedural mechanisms
through which consultation will be carried other than the
bilateral commission remain undetermined.
In other parts of the world, including Norway, Australia, the
United States and Canada, more detail is available regarding the
consultation procedures currently in place. Norway, the only one
of these countries to have ratified ILO 169, reported that in
1987, the Norwegian Parliament resolved to establish a direct
national representative Sami Parliament (Sameting) with 39
elected representatives. The first Sameting was elected in 1989.
It has consultative authority at the national level only, although
the administration of measures respecting local affairs and Sami
culture have been transferred to the Sameting. Its tasks are laid
out in national legislation and include the power to raise
matters, to issue statements and to present matters to public
authorities and private institutions, with regard to all matters
within the scope of its activities (essentially reindeer herding
and fishing and the land on which they are carried out). 139 With
regard specifically to environmental issues, the Norwegian
Ministry of Culture has instructed the regional board responsible
for managing Crown land to ask the opinion of the Sameting
before taking any decisions concerning land-use projects. The
reindeer herding districts are legally entitled to be consulted and
have the right to be compensated in the event of economic
damage.140 With respect to mineral resources, licences or
permits may only be obtained after consultations with the
respective municipalities and the Sameting.141
In Australia, there have been a series of significant reforms
over the past five years or so which have, among other things,
created the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC). Thirty-six regional Councils (aboriginal) have control
over local affairs, and also elect seventeen of the nineteen
139. Id. at 12.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 19.
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commissioners who sit on the ATSIC.142 The ATSIC formulates
national programs and policies; although this body gives
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders direct involvement in
decisions regarding their interests, they cannot participate in
budget-making at the parliamentary level. With respect to
natural resources pertaining to their lands, aboriginal peoples
have the right to withhold consent and to control mining on their
land, subject to the Parliament's right to proclaim that the
national interest required mining on their lands. 143 Thus,
although land issues are far from being resolved, the indigenous
peoples of Australia have been concerned with consolidating
their rights to self-determination and control over land,
exercised through Aboriginal Land Councils, rather than with
asserting a basic right to be consulted.14
In the United States, Indian "tribes" have also tended to
have significant control over their lands, at least as compared to
the peoples of Latin America. Despite recent Supreme Court
decisions, tribes have generally been viewed as having
"sovereignty" (or ownership) over their territories and the
resources pertaining thereto, and therefore the power to regulate
third party rights on their lands. 145 In Alaska, however, the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. conveyed "split estate
lands" in which the surface is owned by aboriginal village
corporations and the sub-surface is owned by the regional
government. 46 The Act provides that the right to "explore,
develop or remove minerals from the sub-surface estate in the
lands within the boundaries of a Native Village shall be subject
to the consent of the Village Corporation.147 Thus, the regime is
not set up in accordance with a procedural right to be consulted,
142. DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, ABORIGINAL AFFAIRS IN
AUSTRALIA: AN OVERVIEW (1995) (unpublished, on file with author) 7 [hereinafter DIAN].
143. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ABORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS 164 (Barbara Hocking ed.,
1988).
144. DIAN, supra note 142, at 5.
145. See generally D. B. Suagee & C. T. Stearns, Indigenous Self-Government,
Environmental Protection, & the Consent of the Governed: A Tribal Environmental
Review Process, 5 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY 59 (1994). The authors discuss in
particular the Environmental Protection Agency's "Policy for the Administration of
Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations," which recognizes tribal governments
as the primary parties for setting standards and making environmental policy decisions.
Id. at 80.
146. James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First 20
Years 38 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 2-1 (1992).
147. Id.
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but rather with a right to consent to or reject the conveyancing of
sub-surface rights to non-aboriginal parties.
Finally, in Canada, a range of consultation mechanisms
exist depending on the regime under which aboriginal peoples
hold their lands: the reservation system, co-management
regimes, or comprehensive land claims agreements. Under the
Indian Act, the Crown holds reserves for the "use and benefit of
the respective bands for which they were set apart, and... the
Governor in Council may determine whether any purpose for
which the lands in a reserve are used or are to be used is for the
use and benefit of the band."'' 1 Although this system produced a
highly paternalistic regime in which Indian bands had little or
no input into decisions regarding resource exploitation on their
lands, it has begun to give way to more participatory regimes
such as the one set out in the Indian Oil and Gas Regulations in
1995.149
Under these regulations, Indian band councils must be
consulted and their "approval"150 obtained at every stage of the
oil exploration and exploitation process: the granting of
exploratory licences, well licences, permits to drill for gas and
leases of land'51. Moreover, the Regulations provide for
notification "sufficiently in advance" of tests in prospective oil
and gas zones such that band councils may be present when the
tests are being carried out.,,
Recent comprehensive land claims agreements have tended
to establish consultation procedures between the national
government and the regional aboriginal governing body in the
case of resource exploitation on aboriginal lands which are not
held in fee simple by the aboriginal peoples themselves.153 In
148. Indian Act, R.S.C., c. 1-5, §18(1) (1985) (Can.).
149. SOR/94-753.
150. Approval under the Regulations is given by way of a referendum conducted by
the affected band indicating that the members are willing to have oil and gas exploration
take place on the reserve. If approval is given, Indian Oil and Gas Canada then consults
with the Chief and Band Council through meetings and discussions which may also
include the oil companies with respect to licensing and permit issuance, etc. However,
whenever a decision regarding the issuance of rights is to occur, band council approval
(written approval evidenced by a quorum of the Council) will be required. Letter from
W.J. Douglas, Executive Director, Indian Oil and Gas Canada (June 27, 1996).
151. SOR/94-753, §§ 6 and 10.
152. Id., § 11.
153. See, e.g., Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada (1993) art. 27 [hereinafter Nunavut Agreement];
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both cases, the agreements provide that "[p]rior to opening any
lands in the settlement area for oil and gas exploration,
Government shall notify the Designated Inuit Organization
(DIO) and provide an opportunity to present and to discuss its
views with Government regarding the terms and conditions to be
attached to such rights."154
The Nunavut Agreement requires that the proponent of the
exploration, development or production of petroleum on Crown
lands in the Area consult the DIO and that the government shall
also consult the same organization with respect to matters set
out in the Agreement.155 The Gwich'in Agreement makes the
same provision, except that there is no requirement that the
government consult in addition to the developer regarding the
exercise of exploration, development or production rights.156
In sum, the norms establishing procedures for consultation
in North America, Australia and Norway tend to be more
institutionalized and specific to indigenous peoples than those
found in most Latin American countries. Where they are not
replaced by outright ownership and self-government, these
mechanisms include consultation on a regular basis, through
institutionalized relationships between governments (national
and aboriginal), and some form of express guarantee that
indigenous concerns will be heard and considered. Despite these
apparently elaborate procedural mechanisms, many of these
states have continued to be criticized for failing to engage in
effective consultations where bureaucratic structures have been
overly burdensome for relatively small aboriginal populations to
support, and where lack of clarity in legislation has led to
uncertainty rather than effective consultations. 17
Gwich'in Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement, (1992) art. 21 [hereinafter Gwich'in
Agreement].
154. Nunavut Agreement, supra note 153, art. 27.1.1; see also Gwich'in Agreement,
supra note 153, art. 21.
155. Nunavut Agreement, supra, note 153, art. 27.1.2.
156. Gwich'in Agreement, supra note 153, art. 21.1.3.
157. See, e.g., Matthew Coon-Come, Environmental Development, Indigenous Peoples
and Governmental Responsibility, 16 INT'L LEG. PRAC. 108 (Dec. 1991) (criticizing the
ineffective and overly bureaucratic structures set up under the James Bay and Northern
Quebec Agreement). See also Linxwiler, supra note 146, at 2-48 (regarding the extensive
litigation which has plagued the application of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act).
See Marine Le Puloch, A Tragedy of Progress: The Lubicon Cree, 12 NATIVE AMERICAS 32
(1995) (regarding the difficulties faced by Canadian Indian bands such as the Lubicon
Cree whose land claims have not been recognized by the Alberta government).
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Overall, then, the outline of state practice offered above
tends to show a distinctive trend toward consultation (or
something more) of indigenous groups. Beyond this general
observation, however, fairly different sets of norms have
emerged which may be used to formulate an international
standard for the obligation to consult under ILO 169. It is surely
no coincidence that the more stringent norms are found in
wealthier countries in which governments have long exercised
significant control over national affairs including, in many cases,
over indigenous peoples and their lands. These differences also
reflect the fundamentally different histories of the various
countries in question.
This divergence is also reflected in the Inter-American Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as opposed to
the U.N. Draft Declaration. Article XVIII(5) of the Inter-
American Draft Declaration simply reproduces verbatim Article
15(2) of ILO 169 requiring states to consult indigenous peoples
where it owns mineral or subsoil resources, without there being
any equivalent provision to the ILO's regarding the need to
consult "in good faith."18 Thus, the Inter-American Draft
Declaration may be viewed as having the potential to lower the
standard for consultation set out in ILO 169. In contrast, Article
30 of the U.N. Draft Declaration requires that states obtain the
"free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project
affecting their lands, territories and other resources, particularly
in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of
mineral, water or other resources."'' 5 Indeed, "free and informed
consent" is the general standard set by the U.N. Draft
Declaration. Consistent with its express endorsement of the
notion of self-government, this instrument departs significantly
from the consultative regime established in Article 15(2) of ILO
169, and would tend to provide evidence of a pull toward much
higher standards in states' interactions with indigenous peoples
regarding resources pertaining to their lands.160
Faced with these divergent trends, several options exist with
respect to formulating a standard for consultation procedures
under ILO 169. First, we could view ILO 169 as having
incorporated a minimum standard of consultation mechanisms
158. INTER-AM. DRAFT DECL. supra note 36, art. XVIII(5).
159. U.N. DRAFT DECL., supra note 34, art. 30 (emphasis added).
160. U.N. DRAFT DECL., supra note 34, arts. 19 and 20.
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for all states, based on customary norms existing at the time it
was drafted: that is, the standards set by Latin American
practice would be viewed as having set the minimum behaviour
which would satisfy state obligations under the Convention. It is
submitted, however, that on the basis of the rules outlined above
regarding good faith and the interpretation of "open-textured"
rules, to the extent that Latin American practice itself is not
carried out honestly, fairly and reasonably or is characterized by
general statements of principle which, in the absence of concrete
action, renders the obligation set out under articles 6(2) and
15(2) meaningless, this cannot be the standard contemplated by
the Convention.
Conversely, we could suggest that the standards set by the
"northern" states are only a minimum, and that in fact there is a
"pull toward compliance" among states toward ever higher
standards for government relations with indigenous peoples, as
evidenced by the U.N. Draft Declaration. This position, although
consonant with the aspirations of many indigenous peoples,
would in fact lead to a re-writing of ILO 169, given that the
obligation to consult would be replaced by an obligation to obtain
the free and informed consent of indigenous peoples. This
cannot be viewed as a viable argument with regard to the
obligations which bind the parties to ILO 169. Rather, it
provides evidence of the possible emergence of a customary norm
which, as we have seen above, is far from being universally
adhered to and would not yet meet the test for the
"crystallization" of customary law set out in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases.161
Finally, we could posit that the standard under ILO 169
should reflect minimum, but effective and good faith practices.
This standard may therefore be higher than that which might be
derived from the current practice of many Latin American
states. It is recognized, however, that the norms established by
North American, Australian and Norwegian practices do not
themselves constitute a sufficiently flexible international
standard to be considered the minimum standards contemplated
by ILO 169. It is submitted that this final option provides the
best basis for determining the standard set by ILO 169 with
respect to the consultation of indigenous peoples regarding sub-
161. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, at 71-74.
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surface resources. It allows us to abstract from the examples of
state practice outlined above wherever we find examples of
effective, good faith consultation mechanisms in order to suggest
measures which would satisfy the obligation set out in articles
6(2) and 15(2) of the Convention.
In doing so, one finds the following general characteristics
for effective consultation procedures:
" consultation takes place prior to government decisions to
open indigenous land for development;
" institutional structures or relationships exist which ensure
regular contact between the State and indigenous peoples
concerned;
- indigenous peoples (their organizations) participate
sufficiently in the relevant decision-making process to allow
them to have their views heard and considered, if not always
adopted; and,
- consultation is done in a framework specific enough to take
into account indigenous concerns and interests susceptible of
being affected by development programs.
These more pragmatic conclusions based on current state
practice buttress the textual interpretation of Article 15(2)
offered above, while also providing more specific standards than
those derived from a purely textual interpretation of ILO 169.
They confirm that consultations may be viewed as effective when
carried out prior to the government's undertaking or permitting
development programs on indigenous lands. Moreover,
consultations must involve the establishment of procedural
mechanisms which ensure regular contact and active
participation in the decision-making in order to satisfy the
obligation that consultations be carried out with the "objective of
achieving agreement or consent" and ensure as much control as
possible over the process. Finally, the tendency to establish
specific procedures for the consultation of indigenous peoples as
opposed to other national citizens, buttresses the obligation on
states to take an active role in ensuring that the interests of
indigenous people will be adequately addressed and social,
cultural and environmental impacts minimized.
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4. Conduct of Bolivian Government
In light of these clarifications, we may now turn to an
assessment of current consultation mechanisms established in
Bolivian legislation and other administrative agreements in
order to determine whether they satisfy the requirements
outlined above.
a. Timing
Article 15(2) establishes that governments must consult
indigenous peoples prior to opening their lands for programs to
explore or exploit sub-surface resources. The right to be
consulted prior to government approval of petroleum and gas
exploration and exploitation programs may be viewed as
recognizing that the entry onto these lands by third parties is
subject to at least some measure of control by indigenous
peoples. In the absence of such recognition, it seems fairly
certain that indigenous peoples will be placed in a weak
bargaining position with respect to third parties such as oil
companies.
No such prior consultation of indigenous peoples by the
relevant state departments or agencies has been established in
Bolivian law. As was mentioned above, in 1993 and 1994,
despite having ratified and adopted ILO 169, Bolivia entered into
contracts granting exploration and exploitation rights in blocks
which significantly overlap with indigenous territories
recognized by supreme decree.162 The only new legislation
introduced since that time with respect to oil operations are the
new Hydrocarbons Act163 and Environmental Regulations for the
Hydrocarbons Sector.164 The Hydrocarbons Act, adopted in early
1996, does not expressly establish any public consultation as
condition precedent to the granting of oil operation rights. The
only general consultation procedures which have been
established thus far are incorporated by reference into Article 4
of the Environmental Regulations for the Hydrocarbons Sector.16s5
162. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 6.
163. Ley No. 1689 de Hidrocarburos, supra note 49.
164. Decreto Supremo 24335 (July 19, 1996).
165. See Regulation for Environmental Control and Prevention, art. 178
(establishing procedures for environmental impact assessments).
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Read together, these regulations require any party carrying
out oil operations on Bolivian territory to consult the inhabitants
of affected lands regarding their environmental concerns at the
planning stage of every phase of their project. These phases are
referred to in the Hydrocarbons Act, and include exploration,
perforation, exploitation, transportation, industrialization,
marketing and distribution. Thus, the legislation does not
provide for consultation prior to the State's granting of approval,
by contract, of the overall oil and gas development projects.
The Supreme Decree which in 1990 established one of the
indigenous territories in which oil exploration is taking place,
the TIPNIS, does provide for certain consultation measures. An
environmental impact assessment (EIA) is required for all new
construction and development works in the TIPNIS. Local
indigenous organizations are guaranteed the right to be
consulted on all "development projects" and ELAs undertaken in
the area. 16
The decree mentions in particular "roads and pipelines"
serving basic infrastructure needs, but makes no express
mention of resource extraction activities. It is perhaps for this
reason that the government did not feel compelled in 1994 to
consult with the TIPNIS leadership prior to granting oil
exploration rights in the S6cure block. It is possible, however,
that this decree could provide some measure of protection for the
inhabitants of that particular territory with respect to future
decisions on the matter.
The fact that this protection proved ineffectual in 1994
pushed leaders of Bolivia's indigenous organizations and their
legal advisors to insist that the government take some steps
toward establishing a consultation process specifically for oil
operations in indigenous territories. On July 19, 1995, a meeting
was held under the good offices of the Beni Departmental
Prefect. The participants included: representatives of the
National Energy Department and of the Beni branch of the
state-controlled oil company, YPFB, the Presidents of CIDOB,
CPIB and leaders of the TIPNIS territory and their advisors, as
well as a legal advisor to the Prefecture and a representative of
the REPSOL oil company.' 7 The government representatives
166. Decreto Supremo 22610, supra note 46, art. 6.
167. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 5.
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signed a memorandum of understanding promising to participate
in a joint State-Indigenous Commission which would determine
consultation mechanisms to be followed in the future. The
agreement also contained a promise that YPFB would never
again sign a contract for oil operations in indigenous territories
that didn't "contemplate in its text the consultation and
participation of indigenous peoples as required by law."168
The full meaning of this ambiguous promise was later
clarified during a subsequent series of meetings that led to
another written agreement which was signed by representatives
of CIDOB, CPIB, one of their legal advisors, and representatives
of the Hydrocarbons Sub-Secretariat, the Sub-Secretariat of
Ethnic Affairs and the Ministry of the Environment, as well as
the Director of Control of Operating Contracts from YPFB.169
This second agreement confirmed that the government would not
accept the indigenous peoples' demand to be consulted prior to
the granting of any contractual rights to third parties for
petroleum and gas activities affecting their lands. The most that
government representatives were willing to guarantee the
indigenous peoples was the establishment of a joint committee of
indigenous and government representatives that would be struck
on an ad hoc basis to hear complaints in cases of conflict between
oil companies and indigenous communities once the oil
companies had begun their work.170
Although they were disappointed with the government's
intransigence, the indigenous representatives and some of their
advisors signed the agreement, noting that this was the first
time that the government had ever agreed to any form of
consultation whatsoever.1' On the basis of their rights as set
out in Article 15(2) of ILO 169 the indigenous representatives
should arguably have refused to sign the agreement. Instead,
they chose to accept it, but also to continue to seek stronger
protection. The current situation, described above, demonstrates
that the government has failed to meet its obligation to consult
indigenous peoples prior to opening up their lands for
168. Id.
169. Acta sobre actividades del sector petrolero en Territorios Indigenas, supra note
111.
170. Id.
171. Interview with J. GonzAlez Humpire, Legal Advisor to CPIB and CIDOB, at
CEJIS, in Trinidad (June 10, 1996) [hereinafter Gonzilez Humpire Interview].
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development and has refused to put into place any measures
which would ensure such prior consultations for the future.
b. Regularity of Consultation
With regard to the requirement of an institutional structure
or relationship ensuring regular consultation, the only existing
provisions for consultation between the government and
indigenous peoples on the specific issue of oil operations in
indigenous territories stems from an agreement signed in July
1996 by representatives of CIDOB, CPIB, one of their legal
advisors, and representatives of the Hydrocarbons Sub-
Secretariat, the Sub-Secretariat of Ethnic Affairs and the
Ministry of the Environment, as well as the Director of Control
of Operating Contracts from YPFB.72 In that agreement, the
government undertook to ensure that a copy of any
environmental impact assessments prepared by companies
operating in indigenous territories would be made available to
the regional indigenous organization, CIDOB. The indigenous
organization would then have two weeks to forward comments to
the Hydrocarbons Subsecretariat. If no comments were received,
the indigenous communities would be presumed to be in
agreement with the assessment and its environmental
management recommendations and the government would
proceed to approve the impact assessment and therefore allow
the project to begin.173
Western Geophysical has sent copies of its impact
assessments to the indigenous leaders of the Beni department.
174
This arrangement is problematic, however, in that the
agreement does not provide any mechanism through which
indigenous peoples can verify that their comments are actually
being read and taken into account by government officials.
There is no active participation of indigenous representatives in
the decision-making process itself. Moreover, the two-week
period is very tight, particularly given the reality of the living
conditions of indigenous communities. In general, they have
only radio as a means of communication, which does not serve as
172. Decreto Supremo 24335, supra note 64.
173. K. Gallagher-MacKay, Legal Regimes for Consultation on Indigenous Lands 19-
20 (1996) (unpublished, on file with author).
174. GonzAlez Humpire interview, supra note 171.
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a very effective means for carrying out lengthy consultations on
complex and technical matters. If they wished to communicate
directly with the communities affected, however, it would take
members of the CIDOB or CPIB at least two days to reach the
nearest communities found in the Chapare and Secure blocks,
and at least five days to reach the furthest, given their
inaccessibility by means other than canoe.
The recently adopted Environmental Regulations for the
Hydrocarbons Sector contains in the second annex a set of
deadlines for the environmental impact assessment approval
process.17 5 This schedule establishes even shorter deadlines for
the approval process for oil and gas operation EIAs than those
set by the general regulation for environmental prevention and
control. The new regulation establishes a total time frame for
the process which ranges from thirty-six to ninety-six working
days (about seven to twenty weeks), depending on the number of
requests for information or clarification made by the various
Secretariats involved. Although this time-frame is limited, it
does not totally preclude at least minimal consultation among
indigenous organizations, particularly if indigenous comments
and concerns could be incorporated into the government's right
to request clarifications and additional information. Nowhere is
there any reference in the Regulations or their Annex, however,
to the agreement referred to above under which indigenous
peoples would submit their comments to the government, despite
the fact that the regulation was drafted subsequent to the
signing of the agreement.
In other words, at no time will Bolivian state institutions
ever be required to engage directly in consultations with
indigenous people with the objective of gaining their consent or
approval to the opening of their lands to oil exploration or
exploitation. Instead, governmental authorities will play a
supervisory role in which they are expected to ensure that
consultations are held, but in which they have no direct role
themselves. Although this may ensure fairly regular contact
between oil companies and indigenous communities, the
arrangement does not satisfy the state's own obligation to
consult. In light of the negative impact that multinational oil
175. Decreto Supremo 24335, supra note 64, annex 2.
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companies have had on indigenous peoples76 and their profit-
oriented motivations, it is submitted that delegation by
government of the consultative role to such corporations does not
meet the standard set by the plain meaning of Article 15(2) read
in conjunction with Article 6, that governments consult and/or
undertake studies. Nor does it meet the good faith test of
reasonableness and honesty required under the Convention: it is
neither honest nor reasonable for the government to expect
private corporations to carry out the social and public interest
functions that are an inherent part of the decision to open lands
for development in a way which adequately balances the
multiple rights and interests at stake. Finally, such an
arrangement does not conform to state practice, at least in
countries such as Panama, Guatemala (in principle), Canada,
the United States and Norway, where at a minimum
governments undertake to consult indigenous peoples directly
prior to opening their lands to third party interests, if not always
on a continual basis after that.177
c. Specific Procedures for Indigenous Peoples
Article 7(2) of ILO 169 should be recalled at this point. It
states: "Governments shall ensure that, whenever appropriate,
studies are carried out, in co-operation with the peoples
concerned, to assess the social, spiritual, cultural and
environmental impact on them of planned development
activities." Surely, the "interests of indigenous peoples"
contemplated by Article 15(2) include all of these aspects.
Indeed, in its preparatory works on this point, the International
Labour Office "took note of the damage caused to indigenous
lands and lifestyles when States ... accord to entities outside
these communities the right of exploration and exploitation of
subsoil resources within traditional indigenous territories.178
Thus, despite the fact that Article 15(2) falls within Part II of the
Convention which deals specifically with land, it is clear that the
possible prejudicial effects for indigenous peoples of oil and gas
activities are not limited to the land alone.
176. See supra Part I.
177. See supra Part II.B.3.
178. ILO Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 58.
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Evidently, the health, quality of life and cultural survival of
indigenous peoples, indeed any people, are tied to the health of
their physical environment. Moreover, indigenous peoples have
continued to emphasize that their "deeply spiritual special
relationship between [themselves] and their land are basic to
their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs,
traditions and cultures."'179 Thus, any review of the degree to
which the interests of indigenous peoples would be prejudiced by
oil operations on their lands must include a review of potential
environmental impacts. On this point, one need only return to
the documentation of the impact of oil operations in countries
such as Ecuador and Nigeria to find proof of the need for a
serious review of the potential impact that oil operations may
have on a delicate ecosystem such as that of the Amazon basin.180
Nevertheless, it is also evident that whenever "foreigners"
enter into contact with indigenous peoples who have been living
in relative isolation, there often occurs a direct and serious
impact on the way of life of the people that is in some sense
independent of the impact on their land per se.181 More
specifically, the social impact of the entry of oil companies into
traditional indigenous lands in countries such as Ecuador has
been documented by organizations such as the Centro para los
Derechos Sociales y Econ6micos (Centre for Social and Economic
Rights). According to the Centre, the introduction of a monetary
economy and contact with outsiders (usually oil company
employees) has shaken the traditional cultures. Alcohol and
other substances introduced by these outsiders have had
devastating effects on social cohesion. Furthermore, these
peoples have been introduced abruptly to the racism and
discrimination which still pervades Ecuadorian society.
L82
Social upheaval due to a clash of cultures and ways of life is
probably an inevitable consequence of the opening of indigenous
lands to activities such as oil and gas exploration. To this end, a
good faith consultation process should canvass potential social
and environmental impacts to obtain the views of indigenous
179. MARTINEZ COBO, supra note 1.
180. See authorities cited supra note 4.
181. See generally MARTINEZ COBO, supra note 1.
182. CENTRO PARA DERECHOS ECONOMICOS Y SOCIALES, VIOLACIONES DE DERECHOS
EN LA AMAZONIA ECUATORIANA, supra note 4, at 11.
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peoples themselves regarding ways in which such impacts can be
mitigated.
Turning to state practice, in Latin America it would appear
that if consideration is given to these issues, it tends to be in the
context of the environmental assessment process. Although
countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, Peru and others generally
refuse to create special mechanisms for indigenous input, they
do provide for general public consultation within the
environmental assessment process. In other countries such as
Panama and Colombia, to the extent that indigenous peoples
have at least some self-government powers over recognized
territories, they may be able to participate in consultations or
negotiations which specifically consider their interests, as
opposed to more general environmental ones.183
In Canada, recent agreements between the government and
the Gwich'in and Inuit peoples have expressly set out the
matters which shall be the subject of consultations prior to the
opening of indigenous lands. For example, the Gwich'in
Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement at Article 21 states that
the following matters shall be considered during consultations in
addition to environmental impact and mitigative measures:
impact on wildlife harvesting; location of camps and facilities;
maintenance of public order including liquor and drug control;
employment and working conditions of employees; processes for
future consultation; and any other matter of importance to either
party.184 The Nunavut Settlement Agreement at Article 27 also
includes as matters appropriate for consultation: Inuit training
and hiring; language of workplace; identification, protection and
conservation of archeological sites and specimens.185 This latter
agreement therefore expressly contemplates the possibility that
the Inuit may be employed by the companies engaged in resource
development, another aspect of these activities which may also
have a very exploitative and negative impact if not properly
handled by all parties involved.
In Bolivia, existing consultation mechanisms are found only
in the context of general environmental impact (EIA) assessment
regulations. The question is, therefore, whether the process
183. ILO Rep. VI(1), supra note 16, at 22.
184. Gwich'in Agreement, supra note 153.
185. Nunavut Agreement, supra note 153.
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established therein is adequate to canvass all of the potential
prejudices to the interests of indigenous peoples as contemplated
in Article 15(2) of ILO 169. Under the new Environmental
Regulation for the Hydrocarbons Sector, there is a provision
requiring companies to consult the public on "environmental
matters" during the process of drawing up their environmental
impact assessments. 86 Thus, there is no express requirement
that indigenous peoples be consulted on matters of social,
cultural or economic impact. There are certain provisions in the
regulations which cover some of the concerns and interests
outlined above, such as a prohibition on hunting, fishing or
purchasing of flora and fauna by employees or sub-contractors of
oil companies (article 27(a)); evaluating whether potential sites
for installations of wells or refineries contain archeological or
cultural resources (article 52(a)); analyzing the biological,
cultural and socio-economic impact of selecting transportation
routes (article 63(a)); and selecting sites for employee camps
which will create the "minimum risk" for fauna, flora and local
communities" (article 109(b)). Including these specific obligations
in the environmental regulation, however, does not require that
oil companies actually consult indigenous communities on these
questions, no matter how wise and efficient it would be to do
SO. 187
There is certainly a potential for the EIA process to
encompass questions of social and economic effects as well as
environmental ones. To date in Bolivia, however, the EJAs
prepared by environmental consulting companies do not contain
any serious examination of such effects.18 There can be no doubt
that efforts were made to determine which current industrial
practices would minimize the environmental impact of
exploration activities, which in the Secure block, for example, are
186. Decreto Supremo 24335, supra note 64.
187. It is interesting to note that the environmental impact assessment (EIA) done
for the exploration phase of the Sdcure block did canvass certain issues relating to the
social impact their activities might have on indigenous peoples, although this report was
drafted prior to the adoption of these new regulations. The EIA makes it clear, however,
that no consultations had taken place prior to the drafting of the report. It does mention
the importance of future communication with indigenous communities in order to ensure
good relations ARTHUR D. LITLE, INC., ESTUDIO DE IMPACTO AMBIENTAL PARA U.N.
PROGRAMA DE EXPLORACION EN EL BLOQUE SMCURE, BOLIVIA (1995) (on file with author).
188. These studies were conducted by Furgo-McClelland, on behalf of contracting
parties in the Chapare block and by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for Western Ltd. in the Sdcure
block. Id.
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expected to affect temporarily about 400 square kilometres of
land due to seismic surveys, and to have a permanent impact on
only a one square kilometre area in total (for well sites,
helicopter bases, etc.).189
The EIA makes it clear, however, that no formal
consultation of indigenous organizations regarding social or
economic issues took place during the environmental assessment
process. Consultants apparently visited various communities
and offered them medical supplies and soccer balls.190 It is
precisely this type of strategy which is resented by regional
indigenous leaders, who feel that the lack of experience of their
people in dealing with outsiders is abused in order to obtain
their consent to the entry of oil workers onto their lands, without
full knowledge of the potential consequences. Furthermore, it
may be argued that where the focus of the process remains
environmental, there will be an inevitable tendency either to
reduce indigenous peoples to objects no different from their
surrounding environment and to ignore their concerns as peoples
and cultures altogether. The notion that ELAs are sufficient to
deal with the interests of indigenous peoples may in part be an
unfortunate result of the strategy used by many
environmentalists whose criticisms of the conduct of oil
companies in regions such as the Amazon, for example, have
generally been phrased in terms of environmental damages,
rather than in terms of human interests.19 ,
On the other hand, the scientific measurement of
environmental degradation seemed to translate their criticisms
into a language that oil companies have understood somewhat
better than the language of human and cultural degradation.
Although this observation confirms the problems with relying on
private companies to make full EIAs, it also points to the
strategic value of environmental challenges as opposed to some
purely cultural ones. There are therefore compelling reasons for
arguing that the focus for the subject-matter in the consultation
process contemplated by Article 15(2) of ILO 169 should be
human-centered, which will inevitably include a consideration of
environmental issues. Nevertheless, given the breadth of the
189. Id.
190. Gonzilez Humpire Interview, supra note 171.
191. See, e.g., ACCION ECOLOGICA, AMAZONIA POR LA VIDA: UNA GUIA AMBIENTAL
PARA LA DEFENSA DEL TERRITORIO AMAzONICO AMENAZADO POR LAS PETROLERAS (1994).
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terms of the provision, Bolivia might be able to satisfy the
subject-matter requirement with a consultation process
established within an environmental framework.
In sum, although there are consultation mechanisms in
place in Bolivia, the government does not appear to have
shouldered its general obligation to consult in good faith with the
objective of gaining the agreement or consent of indigenous
peoples through effective participation as set out in ILO 169,
particularly as interpreted in light of honest and reasonable
state practice. It is recognized that the government itself has
very limited resources, and that it has been under a great deal of
pressure from interested oil companies to keep its deadlines and
other requirements to a minimum.192 Consultation processes
themselves, however, do not need to cost a great deal. The
relatively resource-intensive methods, used primarily in North
America, such as creating permanent commissions are not
essential. Instead, an administrative agreement which
guarantees direct consultation by government representatives
prior to opening lands for exploration or exploitation, as well as
some form of dialogue (not just written exchange of
communication with no guarantee of reply) at regular intervals
regarding oil company activity could be sufficient to satisfy the
consultation requirement under ILO 169. In addition,
indigenous representatives require some form of training even in
order to begin to negotiate in a meaningful fashion. Although
there are no provisions of ILO 169 which expressly oblige
signatory States to provide such training and education in order
to ensure meaningful consultation, such an obligation may be
derived from more general provisions requiring governments to
"promote the full realisation of the social, economic and cultural
rights of these peoples with respect for their social and cultural
identity, their customs and traditions and their institutions."193
192. This was made clear at a meeting with officials from the National Energy
Subsecretariat (Santa Cruz, July 18, 1996), in which the pressure from oil companies to
reduce administrative delays were repeatedly emphasized.
193. ILO 169, art. 2(2)(b). It is important to recognize, however, that indigenous
knowledge of their lands provides significant expertise; one does not necessarily require a
"western" education to understand the environmental and social impact of
industrialization. Ironically, this indigenous knowledge may even be the source of free
information for companies seeking to gain an understanding of the land and climate.
There can be no doubt, however, that some form of training and education-preferably
not from the oil companies themselves, as was proposed in Bolivia-is necessary to allow
indigenous peoples to make an informed choice between various economic,
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Above all, however, the consultative process required under
ILO 169 involves a transformation in the government's attitude
from discriminatory and paternalistic to respectful and
cooperative. The Bolivian government has not yet demonstrated,
either through administrative measures or otherwise, such a
change of attitude, at least with respect to the exploitation of
sub-surface resources pertaining to indigenous lands. It remains
to be seen whether the current project to draw up a regulation
specifically for oil operations in indigenous territories will be
completed and if so, to what extent indigenous peoples will
participate in this process.
C. The Obligation to Allow Participation of
Indigenous Peoples Wherever Possible in the
Benefits Derived from Oil and Gas Activities in
Their Territories
Where indigenous peoples own or are considered to hold
proprietary rights over their lands, they are entitled to some
portion of the economic benefits derived from the exploitation of
the resources therein. In most Latin American countries,
however, the State has retained ownership over mineral and
petroleum resources.19 4 State ownership began historically in
Latin American countries, for example, when the Spanish Crown
gave itself exclusive rights to all mineral and sub-surface
resources in order to enrich its coffers.95 State ownership of
these resources was continued after independence from Spain,
and has been justified in recent decades on the basis that all
citizens, not private enterprise, should benefit from the sharing
of resource revenues.
Thus, in countries such as Bolivia, the Constitution specifies
that sub-surface resources are owned by the State.196 This logic
environmental and social tradeoffs. See Gonzalez Humpire interview, supra note 171.
194. ILO Rep. VI(l), supra note 16, at 58-62.
195. Id. at 58.
196. According to the Bolivian Constitution:
Hydrocarbon resources in whatever state or form they may be found are of
the direct, inalienable and imprescribable domain of the State. No
concession or contract may convey these resources as property. The State
shall undertake the exploration, exploitation, commercialization and
transportation of hydrocarbons and their derivatives. The state may exercise
this right through autonomous entities or through concessions or contracts of
limited duration, to consortia of corporations or private persons in accordance
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of State ownership would seem, in principle, to preclude
participation by particular non-state groups in the economic
benefits gained from exploiting these resources. Instead, all
Bolivians are supposed to benefit from government programs
funded by the royalties from these activities which are of "public
utility" and are carried out under State supervision and
protection. 197 Notwithstanding this legal constraint, Article 15(2)
of ILO 169 establishes that in cases where the State retains
ownership of sub-surface resources, indigenous peoples on whose
land exploitation of sub-surface resources is taking place "shall
wherever possible participate in the benefits of such activities."
First, we must consider the meaning of the term "benefits." The
most obvious definition would encompass any economic benefits
derived from oil and gas operations. It is possible to imagine
that a government might argue that to the extent that it is
encouraging oil companies to provide work for local people, and
to bring commerce and infrastructure to often isolated,
subsistence lifestyle areas, it is fulfilling its obligation to ensure
that indigenous peoples are benefiting from the exploitation of
oil. This would be highly contestable, however, in light of the
documented negative effects of oil operations on indigenous
peoples in countries throughout the world as set out above.19
Turning now to the standard this provision sets for State
behaviour, again we are faced with an eminently open-textured
norm. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the phrase "wherever
possible" must be posited.' 99 On the one hand, the phrase
"wherever possible" cannot be interpreted to mean that states
must always allow for participation of indigenous people in the
benefits of sub-surface resource exploitation. The insertion of
these words was evidently intended to leave states some
flexibility with regard to the way in which they will fulfill this
obligation. On the other hand, it seems fairly clear that a
reasonable interpretation would not allow "wherever possible" to
mean "only wherever the State's own laws permit."
with the law.
CONST., art. 139.
197. Ley No. 1689 de Hidrocarburos, supra note 49, art. 11.
198. See generally Arthaud, supra note 5; see also Ominayak & the Lubicon Lake
Band v. Canada (No. 16711984), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/381D/16711984 (Human Rights
Committee decision released Mar. 26, 1990).
199. HART, supra note 103.
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Two arguments may be used to rebut this interpretation.
First, nowhere in ILO 169 is it stated that this provision should
be viewed as permitting express derogation from the principle of
international law regarding the application of treaties, codified
at art. 27 of the Vienna Convention, that a party may not invoke
its internal law to justify its failure to implement a treaty.
2 00
Thus, as per the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
Polish Nationals in Danzig case: "a State cannot adduce as
against another State its own Constitution with a view to
eroding obligations incumbent upon it under international law or
treaties in force.201
Second, this construction would essentially render the
provision inoperative and lead to a "result which is manifestly
absurd or unreasonable," given that it would make the right to
participate in the benefits redundant in every case in which it
might be invoked by indigenous peoples-that is, where the
State claims ownership rights of sub-surface minerals. The ILO,
in its recent Guide, has acknowledged that the provision gives
governments the ultimate power to decide whether or not
indigenous peoples will benefit from these activities.202
Nevertheless, the Office, in its report on state practice in 1988,
noted that several regimes for benefit-sharing exist. In
Nicaragua, the Principles and Policies of the Autonomy
Commission provided in 1985 that a portion of profits derived
from the sale of resources from the lands on the Atlantic coast
inhabited by indigenous peoples would be reinvested in the
region according to their own wishes and priorities.203 In
Panama, the government has negotiated an agreement for profit
sharing with indigenous peoples of resources derived from a
copper mining project.204 Brazil has long had a provision in its
Indian Statute that indigenous peoples should receive the same
compensation and royalties as other members of the population
for the exploitation of mineral resources. The ILO also
noted,however, that it could find no other evidence of profit-
sharing practices in the Amazon region countries.20 5
200. Vienna Convention, supra note 70.
201. (1931) P.C.I.J., Ser. AB, No. 42 at 24.
202. ILO GUIDE, supra note 11, at 18.
203. ILO Rep. V1(1), supra note 16, at 60.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 59.
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Similar to the nature of consultation rights in various
regions of the world, the Office observed the opposite trend in
countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States.
There, legislation and other administrative arrangements
provide for payment by the government of a percentage of the
royalties it receives from oil companies operating on indigenous
lands to governing bodies of indigenous peoples or communities,
even where indigenous peoples are not considered to own sub-
surface resources on those lands.206 This recognition of
indigenous political structures as part of a relatively
decentralized state apparatus is just one way among many in
which indigenous participation in the benefits of resource
exploitation may be achieved without violating the principle of
state ownership.
In an effort to suggest a reasonable interpretation of the
obligation imposed in Article 15(2), recourse may also be had to
other international treaties or documents which contain similar
language. The phrase "wherever possible" may be interpreted as
hortatory language. Such language often arises in the context of
a recognition that certain states may lack the economic resources
to fulfill their obligations, or that they may have to choose
between the allocation of scarce resources to satisfy the vast
number of obligations that they bear. That is, the impediment to
implementing the treaty is not a legal but an economic one. 20 7 In
the case of the obligation set out in Article 15(2) of ILO 169,
there is no strong argument that economic scarcity should
constitute a valid justification for a State's failure to enforce this
particular obligation to allow indigenous peoples to benefit from
oil operations on their lands, given that the obligation is
presumably only triggered by the receipt by governments of oil
206. Id. at 60-62. Specific examples in Canada include the Gwich'in Agreement,
which provides that the government will pay the Tribal Council 7.5% of the first $2.0
million of resource royalties received by the government in a given year and 1.5% of any
additional resource royalties received in that year, and the Nunavut Agreement, which
provides that the Inuit have the right to be paid 50% of the first $2 million in resource
royalty received by the government each year, and 5% of any additional royalties
received. Gwich'in Agreement, supra note 153, art. 9; Nunavut Agreement, supra note
153, art. 25.
207. See, for example, international human rights documents such as the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in which much of the
treaty is written in hortatory language. The treaty includes phrases such as obligations
"to take steps" to "achieve progressively the full realization" and to the "maximum of its
available resources" the realization of the rights guaranteed in the Covenant.
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revenues. In other words, the obligation is concerned with
distribution of existing resources.
Clearly, the question of distribution of scarce resources does
raise serious questions, particularly in countries such as Bolivia
in which a majority of the population is in need of economic
resources, not just the particular indigenous peoples affected
directly by the oil operations. Thus, one can certainly envision
situations in which governments might decide that it was in the
national interest to continue the policy of maintaining the same
arrangements it has in the past with respect to the distribution
of royalty payments. At the very least, however, Article 15(2)
requires that states consider possible options. One such option
might simply consist of ensuring that indigenous peoples
participate in the sharing of resource royalties in the same way
that other citizens do. This would be particularly relevant in the
Bolivian case, for example, where the minority status and
general exclusion of indigenous peoples from political structures
would appear to militate in favour of a verification by the State
that these people benefit under the general regime of royalty
payments to the respective departments and their
municipalities.
The Bolivian government, however, has simply refused to
consider granting any portion of potential royalty rights from oil
operations on indigenous territories to indigenous
organizations.208 The government has stated that such an
arrangement would be unconstitutional,209 given that it would
imply something less than the full ownership rights to sub-
surface resources for the State as entrenched in Article 139 of
the Constitution.
Thus, the government is invoking the provisions of its
internal law as the justification for its failure to even consider
the question of profit-sharing. No willingness has been shown to
consider whether the current regime of royalty distribution
benefits indigenous people to the same extent as other citizens.
Given that oil operations in territories such as the TIPNIS are
still at the exploratory stage, the government could act
prospectively to provide measures which would more likely fufill
208. Gallagher-MacKay, supra note 173.
209. Gonzflez Humpire Interview, supra note 171. Confirmed by other advisors in




Bolivia's obligations under the Convention. It might thereby
avoid the potential claims of breach and demands for restitution
that might be raised if oil operations in indigenous territories
eventually begin to make a profit for the companies involved.
In sum, the obligation imposed on states to ensure that the
"peoples concerned shall wherever possible participate in the
benefits" of sub-surface resource exploitation activities allows for
significant government discretion and flexibility in its
application. It will therefore be difficult for indigenous peoples
to show that the state is in breach of its obligation, which is
procedural (weighing of the options) rather than substantive.
There seems to be an argument to be made that the Bolivian
government has not even met this low standard. Nevertheless,
it is acknowledged that this argument has a weak foundation,
particularly given the lack of supporting state practice outside of
Norway, North America and Australia.
D. The Obligation to Ensure Fair Compensation for
Any Damages Sustained by Indigenous Peoples
as a Result of Oil Operations on Their Lands
In Bolivia's Amazon Basin region, oil operations are still at
the exploratory stage.210 Thus, the potential impacts of oil
company activities have been limited to those related to clearing
land for seismic surveys, building new roads and base camps for
workers, and detonating small explosives as part of the seismic
survey process.2 ' As has already been noted, however, neither
State-owned nor private multinational oil companies have good
records as regards the impact that their activities have had on
the lands in which exploration and exploitation activities have
taken place. Most recently, such allegations have been heard
with particular force from the Ogoni peoples of Nigeria, who
accused Royal Dutch/Shell of polluting the air and water of their
traditional lands through gas flaring and oil spills from leaky
pipes.212
210. Y.P.F.B., Resumen Contratos de Operaci6n Vigentes (sent as attachment to
letter from Y.P.F.B. to CEJIS, May 3, 1996, on file with author).
211. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC. supra note 187.
212. Paul Lewis, After Nigeria Represses, Shell Defends its Record, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1996, at Al.
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In Amazon region countries such as Peru, Colombia and
Ecuador, indigenous peoples and environmental groups have
long been decrying the damages caused by oil operations. In a
recent study of Texaco's twenty five years of operation in
Ecuador, the following consequences were documented:
[Since] production began in 1972, Ecuador's trans-Andean
pipeline has spilled an estimated 16.8 million gallons of
crude-one and a half times that spilled by the Exxon Valdez.
Likewise, petroleum operations discharge 4.3 million gallons
of toxic waste daily. Recent studies document an increase in
skin and intestinal disease, headaches and fevers among local
inhabitants, and contaminants in drinking water which
reached levels 1000 times the safety standards recommended
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.213
So far, the indigenous peoples of Ecuador have been
unsuccessful in obtaining compensation from either the
Ecuadorian government or Texaco. They recently attempted to
bring an action in negligence against Texaco in the United
States. The class action suit plaintiffs, including 150,000
indigenous people, were seeking damages of US $1.5 billion.214
To date, the case has been unsuccessful as the court upheld the
defendant's argument of forum non conveniens. Nevertheless,
the court did reserve a power to schedule a "status conference" if
no progress is made toward resolving the dispute or completing
discovery for purposes of bringing the action in the United
States.215
The provisions in Article 15(2) relating to fair compensation
for damages were drafted in contemplation of the repeated
allegations by indigenous peoples of the Amazon and other
regions of serious damages incurred due to oil operations on the
lands they inhabit, and the difficulty they have had in obtaining
any form of reparation. The provision is very broad: it imposes
an obligation to compensate for "any damages" which may be
213. Sawyer, supra note 4. See also CENTRO PARA DERECHOS ECONOMIcos Y
SOCIALES, VIOLAcIONES DE DERECHOS EN LA AMAZONiA ECUATORIANA, supra note 4
(documenting the impact of oil operations on human health and the physical
environment).
214. Arthaud, supra note 5, at 218.
215. Aguinda v. Texaco, No. 93 Civ 7527 (VLB), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18364
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 1994).
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sustained by indigenous peoples. The obligation is also framed
in imperative language: "[The peoples concerned] shall receive
fair compensation for any damages" sustained.26 Finally, to the
extent that damages are sustained to the surface area of lands to
which indigenous peoples have recognized title or to the people
themselves, states cannot invoke their ownership of sub-surface
resources to justify any failure to compensate for damages to
indigenous peoples and their lands.
It seems certain that the Ecuadorian case of "no damages"
could not constitute "fair compensation." Apart from this
extreme case, however, there are other examples available for
assessing the "fairness" of compensation where it is offered.
Article 15(2) may be viewed as covering two general types of
damages due to oil operations: first, the "damages" or prejudicial
effects which will be sustained due to normal uses of the land
such as clearing and occupation of forest lands for access roads
and well platforms; and second, any damages, such as oil spills
or the contamination of water and soil from toxic waste, incurred
due to accident or fault on the part of oil companies in the
conduct of their operations. These damages are not limited in
the Convention to injuries to individuals' physical property; they
are expressly phrased in terms of damages incurred by "peoples
concerned," establishing a collective basis for any claims to be
made.
The obligation to provide "fair compensation" for these
damages relates to both the procedural rules which govern
compensation processes, as well as the remedies available for the
two types of damages considered above. In its preparatory work,
the International Labour Office stated that the term "damages"
was not defined in the Convention, since "this appears to be a
subject which would have to be approached in a different way in
each country and in each situation, in accordance with the rules
and procedures laid down at the national level."217
Once again, the ILO obviously left states a great deal of
flexibility with respect to the application of this provision.
Nevertheless, again according to general principles of treaty
interpretation, international tribunals have always adhered to
the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (that the treaty may
216. ILO 169, art. 15(2) (emphasis added).
217. ILO Rep. IV(2), supra note 83, at 41.
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have effect rather than be of no avail).2'8 Thus, "fair" will be
given some meaning in any attempt to judge whether Bolivia is
in breach of its obligation under the Convention.
Both types of damages outlined above will generally be dealt
with under each country's civil law of property and obligations.
Clearly, this raises the broader question of the type of title
granted to indigenous people over their land. In this area, many
States such as Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and
others have been regularizing indigenous land title.219
Land title is currently being consolidated in Bolivia.22
° It is
therefore difficult to provide a meaningful analysis of the level of
protection that the recognition of land rights will afford. It is
submitted that these rights must be sufficiently recognized so as
to bring indigenous lands under the general regime for
expropriation and compensation set out in the new
Hydrocarbons Act. The Act provides that parties conducting oil
operations must obtain surface rights with the agreement of the
owners of the land. A system of arbitration is also established
whereby if the landowner refuses, the oil company or YPFB may
go to the National Energy Secretariat who will proceed with the
expropriation of the necessary land subject to prior payment of
"just compensation" to the owner.22' Provided that Bolivia
provides for adequate protection of surface property rights, this
aspect of the obligation to compensate will be fulfilled.
In addition to compensation under civil law and the
Hydrocarbons Act, indigenous peoples should also have access to
courts with respect to cases of strict liability infractions, which
are set out in the Environmental Act regarding civil actions for
environmental damages and which seems to contemplate actions
in cases of either fault or absence of fault.222 Thus, provided
indigenous land title is sufficiently protected, there are
structural measures in place already under Bolivian law which
should satisfy the obligation under 15(2) to compensate
indigenous peoples whenever damages are sustained.
218. Leonhard, supra note 107, at 166.
219. R. R. Ortega, Notes on the Legal Status and Recognition of Indigenous Land
Rights in the Amazon Countries (1995) (unpublished, on file with author).
220. CPTI, supra note 2.
221. Ley No. 1689 de Hidrocarburos, supra note 49, art. 53.
222. Ley de Medio Ambiente No. 1333 del 27 de abril de 1992, art. 102.
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The question of what would constitute "fair compensation,"
or in other words, a fair remedy, also has a quantitative aspect.
Again, it is not expressly dealt with in ILO 169, and there is
currently very little state practice with respect specifically to
compensation for damages incurred by indigenous peoples.
Indeed, as mentioned above, Ecuador provides a very negative
example. In Canada, on the other hand, the Gwich'in
Comprehensive Agreement establishes first that "as a general
principle, compensation to be offered for lands shall be the
provision of alternative lands of equivalent significance and
value as the expropriated lands."223 In cases where compensation
by provision of other lands is not possible: "[i]n determining the
value of lands for the purpose of compensation, the value of the
lands for the purpose of harvesting of wildlife and the cultural or
other special value to the Gwich'in shall be taken into
account."224
Similarly, the Nunavut Settlement Agreement requires
developers to compensate the Inuit for: loss or damage to
property or equipment used in wildlife harvesting, present and
future loss of income from wildlife harvesting; and present and
future loss of wildlife harvested for personal use by claimants.225
Where indigenous peoples still live largely from their lands and
in isolation from the rest of the economy, special forms of
compensation may need to be established in order to ensure that
fairness is achieved.
This seems consistent with recent developments in the field
of environmental law generally, where work is beginning to be
done to devise means of calculating the value of land and
resources to inhabitants living in non-commercial societies.226
Moreover, regimes governing liability for environmental
damages caused by oil spills in oceans provide some insight into
the issues raised by problems of valuation where property is not
readily convertible into a market commodity. For example,
under the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990, any "sovereign
acting as 'trustee' for the public's natural resources may bring an
223. Gwich'in Agreement, supra note 153, art. 23.1.7.
224. Id. art. 23.1.11.
225. Nunavut Agreement, supra note 153, art. 6.3.1.
226. D. W. Pearce, Valuing the Environment: Past Practice, Future Prospects, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENTALLY
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (I. Serageldin & A. Steer eds., 1994).
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NRD [Natural Resource Damage] action."27 The agency charged
with assessing the value of these damages and ensuring that
they are remedied has designed a computer model that will:
[Estimate the transport and distribution of the discharged oil on
the water surface, along shorelines, in the water column and
sediments; quantify mortality and loss of productivity from
short-term exposure to the oil and the indirect mortality due to
food web losses; and determine whether restoration and/or
replacement actions are warranted and, if so, the cost of such
actions.28 The agency may also require a remedy of
"environmental restoration" rather than monetary compensation
in certain cases.
22 9
Given the social as well as economic and environmental
impacts that oil operations have been seen to have on indigenous
peoples, it seems accurate to suggest that in order to be "fair,"
compensation should contemplate damages to an indigenous
peoples or community as a social collectivity, where appropriate,
as well as for material damages to their lands. According to the
examples offered above, this may require compensation to take
the form of equivalent lands or restoration, instead of money
damages alone.
With respect to Bolivia, there are no specific provisions in its
law as of yet regarding compensation for damages caused to
indigenous peoples by oil operations. However, the Environment
Act does establish the remedy available under a civil law action
for environmental damages, which may be brought by a person
or a legally qualified representative of an affected collectivity. If
successful, the action will give rise to a dual indemnification of
the persons affected and the State.230 The money paid to the
State will go to a Fund which will preferably be destined for the
restoration of the damaged environment.231
Subject to the comments made earlier in this paper
regarding the potential problems raised by dealing with the
interests of indigenous peoples solely under the rubric of the
environment, and provided again that the courts are accessible
227. Molly Holt & Grayson Reed Cecil, Natural Resource Damages for Oil Spills:
The International Context, NATURAL RESOURCES & ENERGY 28 (Spring 1995).
228. Id. at 28.
229. Id. at 29.
230. Ley No. 1333 del 27 de abril de 1992, art. 102.
231. Id.
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to indigenous peoples and will actually enforce Bolivian
legislation, this regime would appear to be likely to satisfy
Bolivia's obligation under ILO 169 to provide fair compensation
to indigenous peoples.
E. Conclusion to Part III
In sum, it has been established that the Bolivian
government has breached its obligation under ILO 169 to consult
indigenous peoples prior to undertaking or permitting oil
operations activities in indigenous territories, and to consult
effectively and in good faith by means of adequate procedures.
There is also an argument to be made that the government has
not fulfilled its obligation to ensure the participation of
indigenous peoples in the benefits of oil and gas activities on
their lands, in that it has simply held up its own domestic law as
justification for its refusal to contemplate any such measures. It
would seem, however, that the current regime for compensation
satisfies Bolivia's treaty obligations, subject generally to the
caveat that until indigenous title is given greater and clearer
protection, the ability of indigenous peoples to exercise their
right to fair compensation for damages to their lands is highly
precarious.
Based on the above assessment of the nature of the
obligations imposed by art. 15(2) and other relevant articles and
Bolivia's conduct with respect to these obligations, we will now
turn to the possible recourses available to indigenous peoples
under ILO 169.
IV. POTENTIAL RECOURSES FOR BOLIVIA'S INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES
It is all very well to establish that Bolivia is in breach of its
obligation to consult under ILO 169. From the perspective of the
indigenous peoples affected by this breach, it is also crucial to
determine whether these rights are effectively enforceable and
what remedies are available to them. We are particularly
interested in determining which recourses are available directly
to indigenous organizations themselves. While there may exist
potential recourses under other international human rights
instruments, we will confine our analysis to recourses available
516 [Vol. 29:3
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for a breach of the provisions of ILO 169. Thus, we will examine
the recourses which are available under the Convention both
within Bolivia and the ILO system. We will then briefly discuss
possible recourses within the United Nations and Inter-
American systems. Two of these flow more or less directly from
the Convention and its adoption into Bolivian law; one may
potentially be available under the Inter-American system. The
potential success and effects of such strategies will be
considered.
A. Recourse Under National Law
Indigenous peoples should begin any legal action in the
national court system under the Convention as it was
incorporated into Bolivian law in the Ley 1257232. Because the
Convention was ratified and adopted by Congress, the courts will
be competent to apply the law.233 This could be done in two
ways. First, they could bring a claim for judicial review of
administrative action before the appropriate court of first
instance, 34 on the basis that the decision by officials of the
National Energy Secretariat and the state oil company, YPFB, to
enter into risk service agreements (contracts) with Repsol in
1993 and Western in 1994235 was illegal under Article 15(2) of the
Ley 1257. As set out above, their actions clearly contravened the
provision that consultations must be carried out with indigenous
peoples prior to the government undertaking or permitting the
exploration or exploitation of subsoil resources in indigenous
territories.
Secondly, indigenous peoples could attempt to bring a
constitutional claim under Article 120(1) of the Bolivian
Constitution. This Article establishes the Constitutional
232. Ley No. 1257, supra note 12.
233. We therefore do not have to deal with the complicated question of the court's
competence to apply international treaty law in a dualist state such as Bolivia. To the
extent that indigenous applicants tried to rely on customary norms or international
principles in their argument, however, this might become an issue. Although Vacaflor
has commented generally that "il nexiste pas une grande tradition de respect des accords
internationaux en Bolivie," I have not had access to relevant case law on the question of
application by national tribunals of international law. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 75
234. I have been unable to obtain the law setting out the competency of the different
levels of courts. However, the Constitution sets out the general power of the courts to
review administrative action. CONST., art. 116(3).
235. Sandoval, supra note 3, at 5.
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Tribunal's competency to hear questions of "pure law" regarding
the unconstitutionality of laws, decrees and other non-judicial
resolutions. At least two possible lines of argument could be
taken in a constitutional action. On the one hand, indigenous
peoples might argue that the Ley 1257, the ratification
instrument of an international convention, is superior to other
ordinary laws. These laws, such as the Hydrocarbons Law and
any regulations made pursuant thereto would be
unconstitutional if they were inconsistent with the Ley 1257.
This strategy is problematic, however, as the Bolivian
Constitution is silent with respect to the rank held by
international conventions enacted by Congress within the
national legislative hierarchy.236
Thirdly, a constitutional challenge could potentially be
brought before the Tribunal under Article 171 of the
Constitution itself, which "recognizes, respects and protects
within the limits of the law the social, economic and cultural
rights of indigenous peoples... especially those relating to their
'tierras comunitarias de origen'." It could be argued that the
rights set out in the Ley 1257 must be viewed as constitutionally
protected rights which provide the basis for a challenge to the
Hydrocarbons Act and its regulations. No such claims seem to
have been made as of yet under Article 171 which, like the
Constitutional Tribunal, has only existed since the constitutional
reforms of 1994.237 If such an argument were accepted, the
applicants would presumably then be required to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between existing legislation and
these rights. This might pose certain problems, given that the
claim is in some sense based on the failure of the legislature to
entrench the right to consultation, benefit or compensation for
indigenous peoples in the Hydrocarbons Act and its regulations,
rather than the inclusion of expressly conflicting provisions.
Nevertheless, the possibility of making an argument under
Article 171 and Ley 1257 may become more interesting in the
event that a specific regulation for oil operations in indigenous
territories is drafted and, in the eyes of indigenous peoples and
their advisors, fails to meet the standards set out in Ley 1257.
236. See Vacaflor for an interesting discussion of this problem, as well as a
comparison to other constitutions in Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay which do
establish ratified international norms as superior to ordinary laws, although inferior to
their respective constitutions. Vacaflor, supra note 27, at 77.
237. MARINISSEN, supra note 44, at 8.
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B. Recourse Within the International Labour
Organization
As many commentators have pointed out, one of the
regrettable weaknesses of ILO 169 is that it does not give
indigenous peoples standing under the formal representation
and complaints procedures which exist at the ILO.238 This is
because representations and complaints of a "failure to secure in
any respect of the effective observance" by any party to an ILO
convention may only be brought by one of the three member
groups of the Organization: States, employers associations and
workers unions.39 Nevertheless, the overarching indigenous
organization, CIDOB, could seek out allies among union
representatives from Bolivia or among international trade union
organizations, for example, in order to trigger the review process.
This could lead in turn to the establishment of a Commission of
Inquiry to consider and report on the complaint.240
More generally, however, the ILO's reporting requirement
for States ensures regular monitoring of Bolivia's
implementation of the Convention. The ILO's reporting form
actually includes the suggestion (but not the requirement) that
governments consult indigenous organizations as part of the
preparation for their reports. The government of Norway has
complied with this suggestion and now sends its reports on ILO
169 to the Sami Parliament for comments. Both documents are
then transmitted to the ILO.241 It is seems unlikely, however,
that in the case of conflicting positions regarding an issue such
as compliance with para. 15(2) that joint submission or
consultation would prove a very realistic or useful recourse for
Bolivia's indigenous peoples.
Finally, the International Labour Office has stated that it
will accept information sent directly by "authentic indigenous
organizations" where communications contain "verifiable
information-e.g. laws, regulations, or other official documents
such as land titles," that the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations can use in its
238. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 13, at 56.
239. ILO CONST., arts. 24-25. The ILO recommends such a strategy in its 1995
Guide. ILO GUIDE, supra note 11, at 28.
240. ILO CONST., art. 26.
241. ILO GUIDE, supra note 11, at 28.
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work as a basis of comparison with government reports on the
implementation of ILO 169.242 S. James Anaya also suggests
that executive action should be subject to international scrutiny:
on this basis, the ILO might also accept for review the August
1995 Agreement made between government officials and
indigenous representatives which again did not contain
recognition of the right to prior consultation, or to any benefits
from oil operations. 43 This option may be the most strategically
useful one, in that it could cause the Committee of Experts to
consider the questions posed in this paper regarding
consultation, for example, in the context of its general standard-
setting mandate.
C. Recourse Within the United Nations and
Organization of American States
Within the United Nations system, the most accessible
recourse available to indigenous peoples lies with the Working
Group on Indigenous Peoples. Oral or written reports may be
made to this group of five experts acting in their individual
capacities with a mandate from the U.N. Economic and Social
Council to review developments concerning indigenous peoples.24
An informal complaints procedure has taken form within the
Working Group on Indigenous Peoples (WGIP), which now
permits interventions by indigenous organizations and NGOs
provided "they communicate mostly facts in an objective manner
as opposed to conclusory allegations of rights violations.245
The WGIP is not equipped to investigate complaints or to
require states to respond to such comments. However, in as
much as it has played a crucial role in accepting the
participation of many indigenous organizations (not just NGOs
with consultative status at the U.N.) and has drafted a
declaration setting out very high standards for state conduct, the
Working Group would presumably be interested in gaining
additional information regarding State conduct. Moreover, there
is a potential for effecting a certain amount of political pressure
242. Id. at 29.
243. ANAYA, supra note 15, at 134. The contents of the agreement are outlined in
Sandoval. Sandoval, supra note 3.
244. ANAYA, supra note 15, at 153.
245. Id. at 159.
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if violations are asserted convincingly such that they embarrass
one or more States in the eyes of the others.
More formal complaint procedures exist within the
Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.24
They may examine and make studies relevant to "gross
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms" or a
"consistent pattern of violations of human rights." It is not clear,
however, that violations of the largely procedural rights set out
in ILO 169 would satisfy either of these stipulations. If the
situation with respect to oil operations in Bolivia grew
considerably worse, however, recourse within this framework
might be available. Within the context of the International
Decade of Indigenous Peoples, the U.N. General Assembly asked
the Commission on Human Rights to consider the merits of the
call made in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action
made at the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights for the
establishment of a "permanent forum" for indigenous peoples
within the U.N. system. 47 The idea of a permanent forum has
received significant support at the Commission. If it is set up, it
might provide a more formal, although still only limited in
influence, recourse available to indigenous peoples within the
international system.
24
Finally, within the Inter-American system, "any person or
group of persons or non governmental entity legally recognized"
of an O.A.S. member-state may submit a complaint to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.49 In order to be
admissible, a complaint must satisfy the requirement of the
exhaustion of domestic remedies. This requirement has been
interpreted relatively flexibly, however, to include a lack of
economic resources and unjustified delays as justifiable bases for
the admission of complaints.250
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), El
Salvador, Mexico and Peru have all expressed their support (at least in principle) for the
establishment of a permanent forum for indigenous peoples. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/SR.
29 13-16 and /1996/SR.30 (1996) 1-4.
249. See Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
reproduced in O.A.S., INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, BASIC
DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser.LIVII.82/doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992) art. 26.
250. Carol Hilling, La Protection des Droits des Peuples Autochtones et de leurs
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However, the Commission must also be given sufficient
information to provide the basis for the allegation of a violation
of a right set out in the American Convention on Human
Rights 51 (American Convention) such as the right to life and
personal security, to health and well-being (generally individual
rights), not just a violation under any international human
rights treaty binding the member state.252 If the Commission
finds the complaint admissible on this ground, it may also be
willing to consider the violation of other norms beyond those set
out in the American Convention, as it did in the Yanomami
case.253 The Commission will then engage in a fact-finding
mission by reviewing the parties submissions, requesting
additional information, and possibly convening on-site
investigations or hearings. The Commission will make
recommendations to the state party in question which, if left
unimplemented, will then be published. In one case involving
indigenous peoples in Nicaragua, the Commission has even
engaged in an effort to mediate a settlement of a dispute raised
by the Miskito people.254 Again, however, to the extent that
Bolivia's indigenous peoples would be attempting, at least at the
moment, to assert procedural (and generally preventive) rights
under ILO 169 rather than current violations to their physical
person, it might be difficult to obtain recourse under the Inter-
American system.
V. CONCLUSION
If the analysis in this paper is correct, it has been
established that the indigenous peoples of the Bolivia's Amazon
Basin region should be able to invoke ILO 169 in order to seek
remedy under national and international law, in both the ILO
and U.N. systems for breaches of the norms set out in Article
15(2) of the Convention. Moreover, in attempting to understand
the standards set by ILO 169, we have examined both the text of
Membres dans les Am~riques, 41 MCGILL L.J. 855, 866 (1996).
251. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.
K/XVI/1.1/doc. 65 rev. 1, available in 9 I.L.M. 673 1970). Bolivia is both a member of the
O.A.S. and a signatory to the American Convention. MARINISSEN, supra note 44, at 23.
252. Hilling, supra note 250, at 865.
253. In addition to finding violations of the rights to life, residence and health, the
Commission observed that "international law ... recognizes the right of ethnic groups to
special protection." ANAYA, supra note 15, at 168-169.
254. Id.
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the Convention and State practice in the larger context of the
development of international norms governing relations between
States and indigenous peoples. In this larger context, it is
possible to appreciate the role that the Convention has played in
setting minimum standards, particularly for countries such as
Bolivia. In many respects, despite our critical analysis of the
Bolivian government's behaviour, Bolivia has emerged as one of
the Latin American states making the most concerted efforts to
satisfy its obligations under ILO 169.
This very observation, however, leads to the rather troubling
conclusion that despite its general "pull toward compliance," ILO
169 provides a fairly awkward and imprecise basis for judging
particular instances of any given State's behaviour. This is
evidenced by the rather tortuous arguments required to
establish a breach under any of the obligations found in Article
15(2): to consult, to ensure participation in the benefits
"wherever possible" and to provide fair compensation. In this
light, ILO 169 gives the impression of being "rhetoric,"
understood in the best sense of the word, but gives few signs of
containing "real" (enforceable, proprietary) rights.
Given the relatively weak protection offered by the
entrenchment of a right to be consulted (although still the
strongest protection offered under Article 15(2) according to our
analysis), one can hardly be surprised that indigenous peoples
have been pushing increasingly for recognition of States'
obligations to respect the right to free and informed consent,
rather than simply to be consulted. In light of the emergence of
a clearer and therefore more easily applicable standard, one is
certainly tempted to suggest that indigenous peoples should no
longer be satisfied with ILO 169. Indeed, they might wish to
resist its ratification, particularly where it could potentially
lower current standards, rather than raise them.
Nevertheless, our analysis still suggests that in the current
international context, and in light of the obvious lack of will on
the part of most States to ratify the U.N. Draft Declaration as
is, s5 5 the more stringent norms contained therein will not
255. At recent meetings of the Commission on Human Rights, government
representatives have taken great pains to express their desire to see the Draft
Declaration process continue. They have never, however, expressed approval of the U.N.
Draft Declaration as it now stands. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/SR.29 and SR.30
(1996).
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constitute binding international law in the near future. At the
other end of the spectrum, the Draft Inter-American Declaration,
at least as it now reads, is generally a weaker document than
ILO 169. Customary norms as defined through state practice are
not yet sufficiently crystallized to constitute binding
international law. Thus, for the moment, ILO 169 remains more
or less the only basis in international law on which indigenous
peoples may defend their claims. Moreover, if the Convention is
used as a strategic tool to push for interpretations which give
effect to the purpose of the Convention and are in accordance
with good faith obligations, ILO 169 has the potential to become
an important normative instrument as it is gradually infused
with higher standards and more precise rules through the
current international process of standard-setting in the domain
of indigenous rights.
